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The happenings on the 22nd of July 2011 are stated to be the most horrible 
events ever happened to Norway since the Second World War. This includes 
the bombing in the Regjeringskvartalet, but more over the shooting spree 
on the island Utøya. Due to the objectives of the thesis I am going to focus on 
the bombing and its impacts, neither forgetting nor disparaging about the 69 
children and teenagers who lost their lives on that day, a day which brought 
tragedy and pain to Norway, its population and the whole world.
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Abstract
Terrorism is a targeted way to hurt a population but also to destroy and an-
nihilate a part of the civilization by attacking the built environment, especially 
iconic and symbolic buildings with its values of collective memory and cultural 
heritage, which is at the latest created by the iconic act of destruction. The resil-
ient city with its integrated plans and programs but also technical, personal or 
physical security aims to reduce the probability and the dimension of terrorist 
attacks. However attacks cannot be precluded and they leave behind open ques-
tions about their impacts on urban planning – in general and with regard to the 
impacted sites and their burden as tragedy sites. Terrorist attacks on symbolic 
buildings in Oklahoma City (United States, 1995), Manchester (United Kingdom, 
1996) and – more recent - Oslo (Norway, 2011) prove that fact. The research on 
that cases shows, that terrorist attacks, their impacts and the overcoming do 
have a very individual character and will always remain a unique and incisive 
event where individual redevelopment prove the abnormality of those attacks, 
even though they increased in number in the last years. The consequence is a 
trend to hardened architecture and changes in urban design with impacts on 
public space and the appearances of cities nowadays. However the legal frame-
work and general urban planning policy does not seem to be affected by the 
attacks. Terrorism is in general a reaction on the policy of the targeted country. 
The reasons for terrorist attacks are not to be found in the urban planning policy 
of a country – urban planning therefore is not in charge for combating terror-
ism, that is to say prevent or ward off terrorist attacks. The balance between se-
curity measures and the qualities of “freedom” and “urbanity” depends on the 
national politic attitude and grown self-image. 
This publication can give a certain contribution to the topic of terrorism and its 
impact on urban planning. The comprehensive analysis of Oslo gives a summa-
ry about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet with regard to the consideration 
of factors such as security, cultural heritage, memorial values, economic aspects 
and planning process design. Although an explicit result of Oslo´s future is not 
quite clear yet and possible further impacts on urban planning in Oslo are not 
evident at this time certain tendencies could be identified with the help of the 
experts. Also the combined reflection of three, under certain points of view sim-
ilar cases shows different ways of overcoming a traumatic shock.
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1 Introduction
Holmenkollen Skijump. The Opera House. The Nobel Peace Price Awards. Hen-
rik Ibsen. Aker Brygge. The Oslo Fjord. These are keywords linked to the capital 
of Norway. Since the 22nd of July in 2011 one more keyword has been added to 
the list: Anders Behring Breivik and his terrorist massacre. The pictures of the 
bombing in Oslo and the killing spree at Utøya were broadcasted and printed 
in the media all over the world, causing a worldwide incomprehension for what 
had happened and sympathy for the victims. The consequences are not yet to 
be seen, but it was obvious that the physical damage of the bombing paled be-
side the psychological wounds of a whole nation. “Vi mistet noe denne dagen 
– vi mistet vår uskyldighet […]” [We have lost something on that day, we have 
lost our virginity] [Wright 2012]. This act of terrorism was the first attack of this 
magnitude in almost 70 years of peaceful post-war history in Norway. 
Over the last decades, acts of terrorism have more and more become a phe-
nomenon of the Western nations and 9/11 became a symbolic number, associ-
ated with terrorism in its cruelest forms. New York, but also London, Madrid, 
Figure 1: Streetart in Oslo. Soruce: Own Photo, 15.03.2012
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Manchester or Oklahoma, have had to face an unbelievably difficult challenge. 
Without speaking of the human tragedy, the terrorist acts impacted society and 
the political actions of the nations and caused physical damage to the settle-
ments. The affected sites had and still have to carry a burden; they are the evi-
dence of the tragic events. Those towns had to face the challenges, each in their 
own ways - a way which still lies ahead of Oslo.  
1.1 Objective of this Paper
The objective of this paper is to understand how urban planning responds to ter-
rorist attacks. The question about how a town should or can deal with its wounds 
is to be answered. This is discussed on two spatial levels – the local level of the 
impacted site and the level of the town itself. 
In order to further specify the objective of this paper, the following research 
questions are raised: 
•	 How is the future of the impacted site discussed and which kind of futures 
can be identified?
•	 How have the factors security and memorial and conservaion values been 
discussed after the terrorist attack, especially at the impacted site? Is there 
a change in the consideration of those aspects in general and if yes, is this a 
shock reaction or will it be a long-term impact? 
•	 Does an act of terror affect only the impacted site or does it impact the whole 
urban planning policy? If there is a change in the urban planning policy 
– how can this be detected and characterised? How does the (new) urban 
planning policy respond to the socio-political approaches of national poli-
tics and the post-terrorism reactions?
These research questions lead to the three core hypotheses which this paper 
will try to answer:
 ! Sites directly affected by the terrorist attacks pass through a different re-
newal planning process than “usual sites” due to their sensible past. 
 ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects se-
curity, and memorial and conservation Values are undergoing a long-term 
change in general consideration. 
 ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks based on the na-
tional socio-political response to the attacks.
3Introduction
1.2 Structure
This paper is divided into seven chapters [fig 2]. After the introduction, the state 
of the current research is outlined, defining the most important terms and show-
ing a general overview of research which deals with different aspects of terror-
ism. The methodology which is used in this paper is described in chapter three. 
The fourth chapter consists of the main part of the paper – the case study of 
Oslo. Both Oslo´s urban planning and the impacted site are investigated with re-
gard to changes after the terrorist attack. This chapter is followed by the analy-
sis of the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester. In the sixth chapter, the three 
cases are compared with regard to similarities and differences. Finally, chapter 
seven tries to answer the research questions and examines the hypothses and 
discusses questions for further research.
Figure 2: Structure of the Thesis. Source: Own Figure.
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2  State of Current Research
2.1 Disambiguation
Acts of terrorism are not a new phenomenon of modern times but have long 
been an instrument of asymmetrical warfare. It is interesting to note, that ter-
rorism is a quite young field of research and researchers have not been able 
come up with a general definition of terrorism. Noam Chomsky [2002] uses the 
definition of the United States Army, describing terrorism as “the calculated use 
of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or 
ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling 
fear.” The German political scientist Münkler [2006: 1] states that terrorism “is 
the application of violence by actors, who are clearly inferior towards their op-
ponents regarding resources and who try to achieve political goals by using 
the psychological effects of physical violence”. A more detailed definition is 
posed by the European Centre of Security Studies [Bockstette 2008: 8]: “Terror-
ism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed 
Figure 3: Moaning at the Security Fence in the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Nobel Pice Price Forum (2011): Oslo Memorials. A Photo Set. 
Available at http://nobelpeaceprizeforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Barricade-near-bomb-site.jpg [Accessed 10.12.2012]
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to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the vio-
lent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic 
symbols).” The role of the media these days is also quite influential, because 
“the symbolism originating from terrorist acts and media marketing thereof is 
intended to address the public, to use them as a vehicle and a communication 
channel to influence the political representatives/decision makers and other 
target audiences. Terrorists fight with limited resources from the underground 
against an adversary unbeatable by military means” [ibid.: 8]. The motives for 
terrorist attacks can differ; though the main ones are political or religious. Some 
sources define different types of terrorism by the background of the responsi-
ble group: right wing terrorism (like in Oslo and Oklahoma), left wing terrorism 
(RAF), religiously inspired terrorism (Al Quaida), ethnic-national/separatist ter-
rorism (IRA, ETA) and single issue terrorism [Europol 2012]. Terrorism should 
not be confused with terror, which describes the violence towards and suppres-
sion of the population by the own government (dictatorships, the war in Kosovo 
etc.) [Münkler 2006: 1]. All definitions point out, that the instrument of terrorism 
is used by an inferior group to achieve (political) goals by using threat and vio-
lence towards the public. Especially the role, influence and possibilities of the 
media nowadays guarantees a high degree of attention, not only at the impacted 
site but worldwide. 
The question is, if terrorist attacks have in fact increased worldwide within the 
last decades, or if this is only a subjective perception due to the increased cov-
erage of media today. It is almost impossible to illustrate the trend of terrorism 
of the last decades. Several statistics are carried out by national or international 
security agencies, e.g. the National Counterterrorism Center or Europol (cf. 
[Europol 2012]), though reliable and generally valid statements can hardly be 
made. The reasons can be found in the different definitions of terrorism or ter-
rorist organisations [Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2007]. Consequently, 
the motives of terrorist attacks are not always clear as well – whether they are 
e.g. politically motivated or religiously inspired. Therefore, a widely accepted 
list of all terrorist attacks is non-existent (cf. chapter 3.3). However, awareness 
of terrorist attacks in the Western civilisation has increased over the past de-
cades, be it due to their actual increase in number, their media perception or 
due to broader definitions, which are instituted by different security agencies. 
When speaking of the Western civilisation the majority view typically speaks of 
Europe and the Americas, based on their common history and the same origins 
of their ethics system. According to Europol [2012: 22ff, 36] the majority of the 
terrorist attacks in the European Union in 2011 were carried out by separatist 
groups, namely the IRA (Irish Revolutionary Army), the ETA and the PKK (Parti 
Karkerani Kurdistan). The National Counterterrorism Center [2012: 9], which 
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has carried out worldwide analyses of terrorist attacks, states that the number 
of “Terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere rose nearly 40 percent from 343 
in 2010 to 480 in 2011”, with the highest numbers being stated for Russia and 
Turkey but also South America, due to Guerilla attacks. Looking at the history 
of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere in the past decades, the most memo-
rable attacks were those in Oklahoma City (1995), Manchester (1996), New York 
(2001), Moscow (2002, 2010), Madrid (2003), London (2005) and Oslo (2012). 
Research on this topic is carried out across different disciplines. Scientists have 
investigated causes, types and methods, the impacts of or reactions to terror-
ism. Impacts of terrorism can be understood as the physical collision on e.g. 
the building material or the significant influence, the effect, on a certain mat-
ter. The reaction on the other side includes the respond to terrorist attacks, on 
an intellectual, behavioural, strategic or objective level. Therefore, research on 
terrorism can be found in the academic fields of political and security sciences 
(“counterterrorism”), psychology, sociology, media and communication and in 
architecture and spatial studies like urban planning. All fields of research are 
integrated and cross-linked, which can be seen in the Symposium “Architec-
tures of Fear”, held at the Centre de Cultura Contemporània Barcelona (CCCB) 
on the 16th and 17th of May in 2007. The conference gathered interdisciplinary 
scientists and researchers who discussed the impacts of terrorism on all aspects 
of Western societies [Graham, 2007].
2.2 Fields of Research – Where Terrorism and Urban 
Planning meet
Research in spatial sciences, like urban and regional planning, architecture 
and urban design can be a direct aftermath of terrorist attacks. This research 
is mainly focused on case studies emphasising the individual character of each 
attack and its discussion with regard to different aspects, like impacts on politics 
(in general), redesign of the site, memorial values etc. afterwards. For instance, 
this can be seen in the case of 9/11 (cf. [Hofmann 2008; Eisinger 2004]). It also 
can be a response to the change in environment, like an increased need for 
security, which most likely originated from a change in the legal and political 
conditions. However, the academic, mainly case-related research and the de-
velopment of theories usually follow a terrorist attack [Sarreiter 2007]. General 
theories about the impacts of terrorism on urban planning policies, concerning 
the hypotheses of this paper, cannot be found. Since the academic discussion on 
that topic is relatively young [Bockstette 2008: 8] publications have focused on 
different aspects of terrorism and only few theories have been developed yet. 
8 Urban Planning After Terrorism
While speaking of the responds of the city and its society towards violence or 
threat of violence the term of “antiterrorism” is applied. Antiterrorism defines 
”[d]efensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and prop-
erty to terrorist acts“ [Department for Defense 2010: 20].  This includes material 
and strategic measures in order to create a safer environment or to respond to 
terrorist attack. In the United Kingdom these measures are mentioned within the 
strategy of “counterterrorism” [Home Office], a term which is used by the Unit-
ed States as well, but in a more military character [Department of Defense 2010: 
75]. However different measures for responding to the threat of terrorist attack 
can be applied, mostly with regard to military defense, security intelligence 
and security architectures. An antiterrosim concept, which is more focused on 
urban structures is the concept of resilience.
2.3 Resilience
Resilience origins from the field of ecology, describing the adaption of an eco-
system to changing external conditions [Christman et al. 2012: 2]. Also used in 
social sciences and psychology (cf. [Solheim Vigmostad 2010]), Resilience is 
applied in the context of urban studies as well. Here resilience towards “natural 
hazards” has been in the focus of research, but “In addition to this, security is-
sues also play a role – especially terrorist threats […] and crime.” [Christmann 
et al. 2012: 2] 
The current research program of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF) discusses the topic of re-
silience also in the context of “civil security” [BMBF 2012]. The program focuses 
on security research and the identification of solutions, which balance both the 
approaches of freedom and security in a society [ibid.: 8f]. Next to research 
fields like social aspects of security or security of infrastructures the research 
program also covers the field of “urban security” and the creation of a resilient 
city. Resilience in a spatial context is defined as the adaption of a city, its infra-
structure and built environment towards the threatening and consequences of 
crime but also of terrorism as an extreme case scenario. The objective of a resil-
ient city is its consecutive functioning due to transport and supply of the popula-
tion in or after a case of conflict and danger. Instruments are - amongst others 
- integrated urban development and protection plans [ibid.: 14f]. Other major 
subjects next to resilience are security in public buildings, neighborhoods or 
public transport [ibid.: 15ff]. The research program started in 2007, is now in its 
second phase and scheduled till 2017; results and solution strategies are highly 
expected. 
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A major contribution to the research on resilience in context with terrorism is 
achieved by Jon Coaffee, Professor of Urban Geography at the University of 
Warwick, UK. In his publication “Terrorism, Risk and the City” (2003) he inves-
tigated the impacts of the terrorist attacks in London between 1992 and 1997, 
especially the perceived risk and its effects on the appearance of the city and 
the institutional security [Coaffee 2013a]. Coaffee states [2013b] that the defini-
tions of resilience differs between both the disciplines and the country-specific 
perspective. Even though the global action plan “UNISDR” tried to converge the 
understanding of resilience, its divergency is still reality. Coaffee also points out 
[ibid.] that resilience is an outcome of different disciplinary instruments and 
strategies and he defines a resilient city as an “urban area´s ability to anticipate, 
absorb, respond and recover an array of disruptive challenges and change”. 
The guiding principles behind the creation of a resilient city are “prepared-
ness, anticipation, subsidiarity, integration, communication and co-operation” 
[Ibid].  Resilience includes therefore the capacity of responding to incidents 
like terrorist attacks, especially since exclusive security cannot be guaranteed 
[Coaffee 2013c].  
Different levels of resilience can be achieved in different periods of time. Short-
term resilience includes the immediate, emergency respond to e.g. terrorist at-
tacks like taking care of the victims of the attack and the safeguarding of the site 
to preclude further danger and the restoration of transit. Mid-term resilience in-
cludes the restoration of a functioning city e.g. by restoring the lost functions via 
interim solutions. The redevelopment of the affected sites and the installation of 
remembrance are long-term goals of resilience. [Vale, Campanella 2005: 337 ff]
Resilience in urban planning covers the strategic aspects of responding to-
wards terrorism and violent conflicts. A physical way to respond to terrorism in 
the built environment and create an (alleged) resilient city can be realised by 
architecture, urban design and security technology itself.
2.4 Security in Architecture and Urban Design 
“Not terrorism, but the way the threat of terrorism is used, is what will have 
the biggest impact on the shape of cities and urban life in our day.” [Mar-
cuse 2007]
Security in architecture and urban design is not a new phenomenon. Since war 
and territorial fights have always been a part of human mankind cities and set-
tlements used to be built with protection and security architecture, just to men-
tion walls, watchtowers, forts or ditches [Engel 2007]. In the course of history 
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Figure 4: NOGO. Source:  [FEMA 2007: 4-46]
those needs have changed in the western world and aspects like protection in 
case of natural hazards became more important. Buildings should be resistant 
towards earthquakes or hurricanes. As mentioned above the awareness of the 
threat of terrorism increased in the western civilization in the last decades – lat-
est since the incident of 9/11 - and therefore the need of terrorist related secu-
rity grew stronger in national politics [Silverberg/Rogers 2011]. The objectives 
of security in architecture and urban design are to “effectively and efficiently 
reduce the likelihood of a terrorist act” [Marcuse 2007]. The framework for those 
measures is given by the legislation; building codes in particular, the security 
policy and other, informal guidelines of each country. Therefore it is “all to be 
seen in a cultural context”, but nearly the same security measures can be found 
all over the world, especially in the western hemisphere. This is not only caused 
by globalization, but “Customers expect the same level of security everywhere” 
[Silverberg/Rogers 2011]. 
The first step of safeguarding should be the evaluation of which buildings, infra-
structures or areas in general are likely to be a target of a terrorist attack. Due 
to the goals of the terrorists – to gain media attention and awareness for their 
motives – certain sites are more likely to be attacked than others. The higher 
the public interest in the target is the higher the media attention will probably 
be. Targets are therefore often public, administrative and iconic buildings, infra-
structure hubs, crowded places or commercial and industrial centres [Marcuse 
2007; Bockstette 2098: 8; Coaffee et al. 2009: 501; Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 55]. In 
order to realise the need for a higher security level different organisations and 
stakeholders have published guidelines and references which deal with the se-
curity of those buildings and areas in particular (cf. [FEMA 2007; FEMA 2012; 
Home Office 2012]). The security in architecture and urban design can be re-
alised by technical and personal security measures, like surveillance evidenc-
es, guards or detectors [Engel 2007; Silverberg/Rogers 2011]. Moreover it can 
be realised by the architecture 
and urban design itself. The 
used materials can be more ro-
bust concrete or break-proof 
glass. Also the buildings can be 
set back from property lines, 
without any context to its urban 
environment and in that way not 
“perceptible” and non-descript 
for the population [Engel 2007]. 
Also there is the possibility of 
the installation and integration 
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of particular active and passive security elements like tiger traps, turnarounds, 
NOGOs, jersey barriers, ditches, obstacles, bollards or else in order to fend ter-
rorist (or crime related) attacks [fig. 4][FEMA 2007: 142ff]. These elements can 
be implemented in a visual way or relatively hidden, e.g. covered with green-
ing and plantation [Silverberg/Rogers 2011; Coaffee et al. 2009: 499]. Graham 
[2007] speaks in the consequence of the increasing of those elements and mea-
sures of the “palpable militarization and securitization of urban space in many 
Western cities”; Silverberg [Silverberg/Rogers 2011] also detected a “security 
creep”, though there are of course differences between each countries. As men-
tioned above the aim is to find a balance between “legitimate” ([Marcuse 2007], 
that is to say measures which evidently decrease the threat of terrorism) mea-
sures and freedom and democracy. Otherwise the safety measures will impact 
the freedom of a country more than a terrorist attack will ever be able to achieve 
it [Graham 2007, Marcuse 2007, Engel 2007].
2.5 Tragedy Sites, Memorials, Conservation Values
Tragedy sites, sites which faced e.g. a terrorist attack, are usually becoming 
“realms of memory” (cf. “lieu de memoire” by Pierre Nora [Bevan 2006: 16]) and 
the “[t]he worth of such places increases where efforts to destroy them remind 
communities of this value” [ibid.: 16]. Those memorial values play a significant 
role in the discussions of the redesign of these sensitive sites. As stated before 
targets of terrorist attacks are often symbolic buildings, buildings and areas 
with a special function or a high recognition value. “Terrorism, it has been said, 
is an act of violent propaganda. […] The more general the target, the less pre-
cise the message” [Bevan 2006: 62]. Which means in reverse: the more specific 
the target, the more specific the message. The cases of 9/11 and Oslo can prove 
this statement. In conclusion those former symbolic sites with values of cultural 
heritage are overlaid with memorial values as well after facing a terrorist attack. 
The latest research on this topic is executed by a research project called “CRIC 
Identity and Conflict – Cultural Heritage and the Re-Construction of Identities 
after Conflict” [CRIC]. Although the term of Conflict does focus on post-war re-
gions and not terrorism the same questions are discussed. “War adds further 
layers to heritage sites, whether it physically damages them or not, as, for in-
stance, the memory of siege becomes part of the fabric of a city, its inhabitants, 
it memorials, and its ruins.”[Viejo-Rose, 2011: 54] This can be stated for terrorist 
attack on heritage sites as well. 
The redesign of tragedy sites is ambivalent. On the one hand “construction can 
be used […] to weave a fabric of a former life back together. Doing so creates 
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new touchstones for collective memory” [Bevan 2006: 176]. On the other hand 
“Rebuilding, whether carried out by perpetrators or their victims can also serve 
to mask the past; to erase the gaps, the voids, to ruinations that bear witness in 
history”[ibid.: 176]. However the redevelopment of the site and especially the 
installation of a place for remembrance is part of the long-term resilience of 
a city [Vale, Campanella 2005: 337ff].  They are the tangible result of the “psy-
chological recovery” [“human resilience”, ibid: 334] of the citizens and usual-
ly linked to the national understanding of restige, the national self-awareness 
the national self-image.  The reconstructed site and the place of remembrance 
therefore have a “wider ideologic significance” [ibid: 342] and can reach be-
yond the actual limits of the incidents, e.g. the terrorist attack.  
Memorials are not only important for the victims of e.g. a terrorist attack per 
se, but for everybody who is conscious about the tragedy and wants to be re-
minded “of not just of who the heroes are, but why we consider them heroes”, 
that is to say to be reminded of the “ideals that are always on the periphery of 
our awareness, but shape our values”. Therefore “Dark Tourism”, the touristic 
use of tragedy sites, is reasonable and should be considered in the redesign of 
the sites as well. [Hetter 2012] 
Under these special circumstances it is obvious that memorial values have to be 
considered in the redesign process in particular. It is also obvious, that this pro-
cess is not comparable to other “usual” sites, even other usual heritage sites. The 
conservation process of tragedy sites craves for quicker responses and more 
stakeholders due to more intractable conflicts and a wider range of memorial 
responses [Mason 2012]. In this context the danger of creating a “false” memory 
should be mentioned. Not only the design of the memory is important, but also 
its perception and interpretation. Bevan [2006: 199] refers here to the Ground 
Zero planning, which design concepts fits perfectly into the built environment 
but its memorial values are questionable, for they are not addressing the victims 
of the 9/11 incident but proclaim the values of the United States of America, 
without reflecting the background for the attack. The same “absence of context” 
can be stated for the Oklahoma City-memorial [Doss 2010: 147]. “When history 
is not understood it is more likely to be repeated” [Bevan 2006: 199]. 
2.6 Contextualisation
Terrorism is a targeted way to attack a population but also to destroy and an-
nihilate a part of the civilization by attacking the built environment, especially 
iconic and symbolic buildings with its values of collective memory and cultural 
heritage, which is at the latest created by the iconic act of destruction. In a case 
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of conflict and terrorism - moreover their prevention - antiterrorism is the stra-
tegic concept for a civilization and its built environment to maintain its functions. 
Instruments can be integrated plans and programs but also technical, personal 
or physical security measures. With those measures the probability and the di-
mension of terrorist attacks can be reduced, however they cannot be precluded. 
In case of an attack, a city has to prove its resilience and face the challenge of 
healing its wounds, especially the physical ones on site of the terrorist attack. 
Considering this background the paper will review the hypotheses on the basis 
of the case of Oslo in Norway, a country which has never experienced terrorism 
in such dimension before. The paper analyses in how far the attack impacts the 
urban planning policy, especially the consideration of security and protection 
and conservation of symbolic buildings. Also the reactions on a urban planning 
level to the terrorist attack in order to support the creation of a resilient city are 
investigated, both on a citywide scale and on-site. The site had already a sy-
molic significance before the attack which is now overlaid with the prominence 
as a tragedy site. The paper will give answers about the redesign process and 
the integration of the factors security, memorialisation and conservation into the 
new redevelopment. The two similar cases Oklahoma City and Manchester have 
faced these questions more then 15 years ago and the answers can contribute 
to the hyptheses as well. 
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3 Methodology
3.1 Paper Objective and Research Design
The objective of this paper is to understand how urban planning can respond 
to threats and impacts of terrorism, both in its general course and at the explicit 
impacted site. The hypotheses, as mentioned above, are:
 ! Sites of terrorist attacks are passing through a different renewal planning 
process other than “usual sites” due to their sensible destiny. 
 ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects se-
curity, and memorial and conservation values are undergoing a long-term 
change in general consideration. 
 ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks in dependency of 
the national socio-political respond on the attacks.
In order to answer the hypotheses and the implied research questions and to 
Figure 5: Y-Blokka and Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 17.12.2011
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achieve the objective of this paper the objects of investigation have to be opera-
tionalised, that means the objects of the paper have to be defined in an empiric 
measurable way [Atteslander: 46]. This step is followed by the data collection, 
which is realised by qualitative interviews and a literature research. This meth-
od is chosen due to the fact that research on the terrorist attack in Oslo is sparse 
and this explorative, inductive approach can help to develop an understanding 
for the object. Especially case studies are used in order to collect qualitative 
aspects, evaluations and relations with regard to a subject [Atteslander: 61]. “A 
case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenom-
enon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” [Yin: 18]. The analy-
sis of the case of Oslo and the terrorist attack on the 22nd of July in 2011 should 
give distinct answers to the research questions. Additionally two other cases are 
investigated as well in order to increase the validity of the hypotheses. 
The detailed research design consists of three main steps, using a combination 
of different qualitative research methods:
1) The case study of Oslo
2) The cases Oklahoma City and Manchester
3) Analysis, Comparison & Conclusions
3.2 The Case Study of Oslo
The attack in Oslo is one of the most recent terrorist attacks in the Western ci-
vilisation. More than one year has passed since the attack, which allows a first 
analysis and evaluation of this case on the basis of the research questions. In 
order to answer them, they have to be parameterised and transferred to the 
special case of Oslo first. The approximation to the objective of the paper can be 
realised by analysing urban planning in Oslo. It is needed to look at two levels of 
discussion, the general urban planning course and the redevelopment process 
on the impacted site. On order to identify possible changes and impacts the the 
urban planning policy before the terrorist attack has to be characterised and 
compared with the policy nowadays after the 22nd of July 2011. The detailed 
questions for the case studies are:
… with regard to the general urban planning:
•	 What are the general characteristics of urban planning in Oslo, before 
and after 22/07? Have there been changes in the legal framework?
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•	 What does the socio-political background look like and how has it been 
impacted by the terrorist attack?
•	 Which kind of projects were done and which overall concepts were guid-
ing? Have the projetcs changed after the terrorist attack due to a change 
in the overall concept? Are there new projects due to the attack?
•	 Which role played the factors security, memorialisation and cultural 
heritage/conservation in urban planning, that is to say in the projetcs, 
development plans and general mentality? Is there a change detectable 
after the terrorist attack?
•	 How can the role of participation be characterised? On which level are 
urban development projects and plans dicussed in general? 
•	 In what way is urban planning in Olso inspired by international trends 
and influences?
...and with regard to the impacted site:
•	 Which factors are discussed in the process of the future of the site and 
which role play the factors security, memorialisation and conservation?
•	 Who is part of the process, how is the process structured?
•	 Which solutions on the sensitive site are suggested and discussed – “ta-
bula rasa” or reconstruction?
•	 Where other cities with similar history consulted?
The data collection is realised by using primary and secondary data. The pri-
mary data collection is based on non-standardised, partly structured expert In-
terviews in order to collect qualitative aspects on that topic [Atteslander: 133]. 
Responsible urban planning authorities in Oslo, representatives of the projects, 
experts for cultural heritage and responsible governmental authorities have 
been interviewed face-to-face, by telephone or written. In addition to the inter-
views the presentations and the discussion results from the seminar “Regjering-
skvartalets fremtid: arkitektur & verdier” which took place at the AHO on the 12th 
of March in 2012 were used [OCCAS 2012]. The secondary data source consists 
of relevant written documents. The used data is based on articles in newspapers 
and professional journals, project documents, official, formal and informal con-
cepts and strategy papers on urban planning and the socio-political approach-
es and legal documents if necessary. 
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Expert / Auhority Date of Interview Interview form
Berit Skarholt
Oslo Plan- og Bygningsetaten (Oslo 
Planning Authority)
27.03.2012 Face to Face interview at 
the Plan- og Bygningse-
taten, Oslo
Knut Grønntun
Miljøvernedepartementet (MD) 
(Ministry of Environment)
09.08.2012 Written interview, Email-
respond
Knut Felberg
Statsbygg (Directorate of Public 
Construction and Property)
12.08.2012 Written interview, Email-
respond
Pål Henry Engh
LPO Arkitekter 
11.09.2012 Telephone interview
Elisabeth Seip
AHO (Institute of Architecture and 
Design Oslo)
12.09.2012 Telephone interview
Guro Voss Gabrielsen
Norsk Form (Foundation for Design 
and Architecture)
19.09.2012/ 
30.10.2012
Written interview, Email 
respond / Face to face, 
Berlin
Petter Mohaug
NIKU
12.11.2012 Face to face
Fornyings-, administrasjons- og 
kirkedepartementet (FAD) (Ministry 
of Government Administration, Re-
form and Church Affairs)
- No respond
Table 1: List of Experts. Source: own data.
3.3 Oklahoma City and Manchester 
As mentioned above two other cases are analysed as well in order to draw con-
clusions regarding the verification of the hypotheses.
For this paper the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester have been chosen. 
As already illustrated above there is no comprehensive “classification” of ter-
rorist attacks. The following table shows a list of recognizable terrorist attacks in 
the Western Hemisphere of the last decades.
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Incident Country Date Target Motive Attack 
Type
Victims 
(dead/
injured)
Oklahoma 
City Bomb-
ing
USA 19.04.1995 Building 
(Federal 
Govern-
ment)
Right-
wing
Car 
bomb
168/>680
Budyon-
novsk hos-
pital hos-
tage crisis
Russia 14.-
19.06.1995
Building Separatist Hostage 
taking
140/415
Manchester England 15.06.1996 Building Separat-
ist (Pro-
visional 
IRA)
Car 
bomb
0/212
New York 
“9/11”
USA 11.09.2001 Buildings Religious-
inspired
Airplane 
hijack
2996/
>6000
Moskow 
Theatre 
Siege
Russia 23.-
26.10.2002
Building Separatist Hostage 
taking
170/>700
Madrid 
Train 
Bombings
Spain 11.03.2004 Infrastruc-
ture
Religious-
inspired
Back-
pack 
bombs
191/2050
London 
Bombings 
“7/7”
England 07.07.2005 Infrastruc-
ture, Gen-
eral Public
Religious-
inspired
Back-
pack-
bombs
56/700
Moskow Russia 29.03.2010 Infrastruc-
ture
Separatist Back-
pack-
bombs
40/102
Oslo* Norway 22.07.2012 Building 
(Govern-
ment)
Right-
wing
Car 
bomb
8/209
*consideration of the bombing only in the Regjeringskvartalet
Table 2: Recognisible Terrorist Attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Source:  Wikipedia (2012): List of 
terrorist incidents. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents [Accessed 
11.08.2012]
Examples which are religious-inspired, like 9/11, Madrid or London, have not 
been chosen consciously in order to avoid the discussion about different cul-
tural areas and the sensitive topic of religious conflicts, which would overcharge 
the possibilities of this paper. 
Among the remaining cases Oklahoma City and Manchester are most compa-
rable to the case of Oslo due to the target of the attack (public buildings) and the 
attack type (car bombings). Especially the case of Oklahoma City shows a high 
similarity to the case of Oslo. 
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However certain questions should be answered due to the hypotheses:
•	 How have Oklahoma City and Manchester dealt with the challenge, es-
pecially on the impacted site?
•	 Which factors were important for reuse of the site (cultural heritage vs. 
security)?
•	 Has there been a change in their urban planning policy? Are there de-
tectable effects on urban planning policy?
•	 Did they consult other cities?
•	 Which conclusions can be drawn in general? 
In order to answer those questions secondary data is used. Relevant written 
documents, dealing with the impacts of the terrorist attack and the redesign of 
the impacted site is to be consulted. 
3.4 Analysis, Comparison & Conclusion
As mentioned above the third step in the research design is the analysis of all 
cases, the comparison and the conclusion. The questions here are: What have 
the cases in common, what is different and why is that? Are there similar or com-
parable patterns in the decision making and the dealing with terrorist impacted 
sites? Is there a general respond to terrorism in urban planning? Conclusions 
should be drawn with regard on the research questions. The criteria on which 
the comparion is based can be seen in table 3.
Criteria related to 
the attacked site and 
redevelopment process
•	 Redevelopment goals
•	 Consideration of the factors security, 
memorialisation and conservation values
•	 Role of participation
•	 Level of discussion (local, national etc.)
•	 Used instrument for the redevelopment process
•	 Duration
•	 Consultation of other cities with similar 
experiences
Criteria related to possible 
reactions of urban planning 
•	 Planning related legislation
•	 influences of security requirements on urban 
planning, e.g. guidelines, manuals, handbooks etc. 
Table 3: Criteria for the comparison of the three case studies. Source: own data.
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3.5 Objectivity, Validity & Reliability
Objectivity, validity and reliability are harder to achieve in case studies and 
qualitative methods compared to cross case or quantitative studies. Due to the 
small number of statistic cases, the results are difficult to transmit and compare 
and the object of research is strongly focussed [vgl. Atteslander: 61; Diekmann: 
142]. In this paper the objectivity is limited because the interviewer, that means 
the author of the paper, is emotionally involved in the topic. Yet it is a question 
of defining the term. For this case study the quality criteria of inter-subjectivity 
is more pertinent. Also the results are restricted in their reliability due to the 
fact, that the measuring instrument – the interview – reflects personal opinions, 
which are neither right nor wrong but give a subjective evaluation of the topic. 
Moreover the validity is not guaranteed as the results are dependent on the ex-
perts, who were interviewed. It is questionable, if they are qualified as experts 
and if they were able and willing to answer the questions appropriate. [Diek-
mann: 543; Atteslander: 61]
3.6 Limitations
There are also certain limitations connected to this analysis. Since the case of 
Oslo is just something over one year ago not enough time has passed in order 
to give final answers. So the information and results which are presented are just 
a preliminary result, which will only be able to show a certain tendency. The re-
sults for the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester however are more definite 
but the possibility of incompletion is given due to the research method. A more 
extended qualitative research on those two cases would have overburdened the 
paper. 
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Figure 6: Security-Fence around Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012
4 The Case Study of Oslo
This chapter consists of the case study of Oslo, focusing on the impacts of the 
terrorist attack both on the site of the attack and on the urban planning policy. 
4.1 General Information
Oslo is the capital of Norway, a country with 4.9 million inhabitants in the north 
of Europe. Norway is a unitary state, ruled by a constitutional monarchy and a 
parliamentary system. Heads of the nation are King Harald V and the Prime Min-
ister Jens Stoltenberg. Leading party is the social-democratic “Norske Arbei-
derparti (Ap)”, the Norwegian Labour Party. Due to the local self-government 
the most important governmental units are the counties and the municipalities, 
which is enshrined in the legislative. [Königliche Norwegische Botschaft 2009]
With its 600.000 inhabitants Oslo is the biggest town in Norway, situated in the 
south of the country, surrounded by the Oslo-Fjord and the “Oslo-Marka”, the 
recreational area  [Utenriksdepartementet 2012: 11]. Besides the form of govern-
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ment the Norwegian Constitutions also promotes core values, which are based 
on the Christian and Humanist inheritance. Moreover the constitution should 
guarantee democracy, constitutional legality and human rights. These values in-
clude freedom, freedom of speech, tolerance, solidarity, security and openness. 
[Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet 1814: §2; Harald V 2011; Stoltenberg 2011]
Since the Second World War Norway has hardly been exposed to terrorism. 
Though there has been a few number of violent actions, mostly motivated by 
right-wing extremist, but seldom with serious impacts on both the population 
and policy. Due to the involvement of Norway in the war in Afghanistan and in 
context with the happenings in New York, London and Madrid a certain threat 
by especially religious-inspired terrorism was stated by the police. The general 
threat level however was stated as low [Bech Gjorv 2012: 46]. Norway therefore 
does not have explicit experiences with terrorism or violent attacks in a bigger 
dimension. Neither the population nor the government felt a certain threat [Jo-
hansen/Sæther 2011]. 
4.2 Urban Planning in Oslo
Urban Planning in Norway is, according to § 3-3 of the Planning and Building 
Act (Plan- og byggningsloven PBL [Miljøverndepartementet 2008]), executed 
by the municipalities. The supreme planning authority in Norway is the Ministry 
of Environment (Miljøverndepartementet MD) [Grønntun 2012]. The agency in 
charge for urban planning in Oslo is the Agency for Planning and Building Ser-
vices (Bygg- og Planetaten PBE). The three main departments of the agency are 
dealing with Urban Development, Area Development and Building Construc-
tion Projects. The Department for Urban Development is working on a munici-
pal master plan (Kommuneplan, [MD 2008: Kapittel 11 PBL]) for Oslo, which will 
be completed in 2013. The municipal master plan will include thematic plans 
(Kommunedelplaner), e.g. for cultural heritage or green spaces as well. The 
Department for Building Construction Projects is basically in charge for build-
ing permissions. The Department for Area Development is working on zoning 
plans (Reguleringsplan, [MD 2008: Kapittel 12 PBL]) for bigger areas of the city. 
The work also includes the planning and development of public buildings, like 
social infrastructure or cultural buildings. Furthermore the department takes 
account for a development which is planned in context with the urban planning 
guidelines and overall concepts. It usually provides different alternatives for 
a planned project. Due to the regulations of the Panning and Building Act the 
process for the development of plans is long and formal. [Skarholt 2012, City of 
Oslo 2006]
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The site related urban development is mostly initiated by private investors and 
developers by so called project plans (Tiltak [MD 2008: §1-6 PBL]) – “in-fill de-
velopment plans tailor-made for small building projects in urban areas”. They 
can be approved without the steps of the planning process if they are in line with 
a zoning plan or the municipal master plan [Falleth/Hansen 2011: 2; MD 2008: 
§1-6 PBL]. The role of the planner in the planning process is reduced to modera-
tion between the private developers and the politicians. They guide through the 
formal planning steps until the final approval is reached. [Skarholt 2012; Falleth/
Hansen 2011: 2] Urban planning in Norway is highly characterised by the neo-
liberal influences and their shift from government to governance, which can be 
clearly seen in the role allocation between planners and private investors [Fall-
eth/Hansen 2011: 2ff]. 
Planning in Norway should, according to the Planning and Building Act [MD 
2008: §1-1 PBL] promote a sustainable development for the benefits of individu-
als, the society and future generations. In addition the overall concept for urban 
planning in Oslo refers to the location of the capital. Situated between the Oslo 
Fjord and the Marka the urban development is in line with the slogan “Oslo, the 
city between the blue and the green” [Skarholt 2012]. This concept has to be 
balanced with the challenges of Oslo nowadays. The capital has been growing 
in the last decades and will continue to grow by around 100.000 people within 
the next ten to 20 years. This growth is restricted by the city limits, which puts 
a high pressure on the municipal area. Suburbanization or incorporation is not 
wanted and is not in line with the overall concept due to the conservation of 
the surrounding landscape. Therefore development strategies are focusing on 
a better connection to the satellite towns (e.g. Groruddalen) and the densifica-
tion/agglomeration of the city (e.g. via wasteland transformation). Especially 
the last strategy requires the integration of traffic solutions and the maintenance 
of urban quality into the compact development. [Seip 2012; Skarholt 2012] 
The big projects consequently show these strategies, namely the “Fjordbyen”-
Figures 7, 8: Oslo Opera House and Barcode-Development in Bjørvika.Source: Own Photos, 
15.11.2011
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project and “Groruddalen”, which are realised in Oslo in responsibility of the 
Department for Area Development in the last years. “Groruddalen” is a project 
of wasteland transformation, in order to create new space for traffic, dwellings 
and the appendant infrastructure without destroying the landscape. Grorud-
dalen is a suburbian area where four districts of Oslo are located. The devel-
opment of Groruddalen focuses on more functional traffic solutions which will 
improve and connect the whole area [Oslo Kommune 2012]. The “Fjordbyen”-
project includes the conversion of the abandoned industrial harbor area into a 
waterfront development with dwellings, leisure, commercial and cultural build-
ings. It consists of subprojects, like Aker Brygge or Filipstad. The project “opens 
the town to the Fjord” and implies the agglomeration and densification within 
the city. “Bjørvika” with the new Opera House is the latest subproject which 
transforms the area close to the main station in the east of the town. [Seip 2012, 
Skarholt 2012] 
Especially the Fjordbyen-Project and its waterfront development reflects the in-
ternational influences, not only because international architects designed the 
buildings but also because the focus on open public spaces and squares as 
a new influence on the Norwegian building tradition [Seip 2012].  This inter-
national influence is also visible in older developments of the town. Oslo is a 
small city in the European context, but as Norway`s capital it is a representa-
tive city and influenced by other (European) architectural styles. Not all of the 
planned projects have been realised which resulted in a mixture of different 
styles and epochs. This can be seen all over the town, also in the Regjering-
skvartalet, where the German Jugendstil (G-blokka) and LeCorbusiers Func-
tionalism (Høyblokka) meet. This mixture is part of Oslo`s identity. [Engh 2012]
The Planning and Building Act [MD 2008: § 1-1 PBL] requires that ”Planlegging 
og vedtak skal sikre åpenhet, forutsigbarhet og medvirkning for alle berørte in-
teresser og myndigheter” [Planning and decision making shall ensure transpar-
ency, predictability and participation of all interested parties and authorities.]. 
This is explained more detailed in chapter five of the Act as the general regu-
lation allows for the participation in every kind of plan, weather it is executed 
by the municipality, authorities or private investors. The municipality has to en-
sure the participation; especially for groups who cannot participate directly, like 
children and teenagers. The participation includes both the consultation of all 
affected local, regional and national authorities and public or private organisa-
tions, and the public review process. This is also mentioned in the regulations 
of the different types of plans [MD 2008: § 5-1, §5-2]. In reality the fact that the 
formal participation process usually starts after the most important decisions 
are already made between planners and investors reflects the huge influence of 
private investors on urban development. Plans do usually have a certain prog-
27The Case Study of Oslo
ress before the formal planning steps of the Planning and Building Act applies. 
The interaction between planners and investors is very intense from begin on, 
aiming to gain formal approval of the plan. In contrast the public is contacting 
their local politicians for participation in and opposition against certain plans. 
Because when they are formally allowed to participate, too many decisions have 
already been made.  It is then the task of the planners to negotiate between the 
politicians (that is to say the public) and the private developers. Participation 
– in particular of the population - therefore tends to have a negative image. On 
the other hand, an early involvement of the population could probably avoid 
conflicts like the design for the new Munch Museum (Lambda Building) which 
was refused by the public, after the design competition took place. Berit Skar-
holt [2012] points out that transparency and information of plans are important 
before decisions are made, since “the interest of the population in urban devel-
opment grew within the last years”, even it can be difficult to make them under-
stand the whole context of a decision. [Skarholt 2012; Falleth/Hansen 2011: 15f] 
As mentioned above, the planning authorities should grant that urban planning 
is realised with regard to several aspects which are explicit mentioned in the 
Planning and Building Act or are a consequence of other subordinate plans and 
programs. This is supported by the regulations for participation and consulta-
tion of all affected authorities and organisations. With regard to the objective of 
the paper the consideration of cultural heritage and conservation values and 
security aspects in urban development projects will be further analysed.   
The Planning and Building Act promotes the conservation of “verdifulle [...] kul-
turmiljøer” [valuable cultural environment] [MD 2008: § 3-1 PBL], which includes 
cultural heritage sites and listed buildings in the urban development. Conser-
vation vallues are in fact a factor of consideration, but of course next to other 
aspects like green structures and economy [Skarholt 2012]. Buildings, which 
are not listed but collected in an informal yellow list (“gul liste”), are taken into 
consideration as well, but reality shows, that there is no priority of cultural heri-
tage, especially next to economic aspects [Seip 2012, Molaug 2012].  Evidences 
for this statement are given by the new design plans for the Deichmann- library, 
the Munch Museum and the Bislett Bath or the alteration in use of the Eldorado-
Cinema or the old Opera House [Askedal 2012, Molaug 2012].  The tendency 
of dislocating former cultural sites in Oslo (Munch Museum, Opera House, De-
ichmann Library) and replacing them by modern constructions due to political 
reasons. This is usually connected with urban development strategies and the 
upgrading of decayed areas [Molaug 2012]. 
Security aspects have not been a prior consideration in urban planning until the 
events of the 22nd of July 2011 [Skarholt 2012, Seip 2012]. Their consideration is 
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though enshrined in the Planning and Building Act [MD 2008: § 3-1f; 3-1h PBL] 
with regard to crime prevention and the promotion of safety for health, environ-
ment, infrastructure and material values. A more pertinent regulation is given 
by § 4-3 PBL [MD 2008], which deals with the  “Samfunnssikkerhet og risiko- 
og sårbarhetsanalyse“ [Societal safety and risk and vulnerability assessment]. 
This regulation promotes, that every development plan should include an as-
sessment, which analyses the possibilities of any “fare, risiko eller sårbarhet” 
[danger, risk or vulnerability] [ibid.] of the planned development to the envi-
ronment and the society. If a certain issue is detected the area and its special 
considerations should be marked in the plans, including the subsequent prohi-
bitions and restrictions. According to the Planning and Building Act and with fo-
cus on security those areas should be indicated as “Sikrings-, støy- og faresoner 
med angivelse av fareårsak eller miljørisiko” [Safety, noise and danger zones, 
with an indication of the cause of danger or environmental risk] [MD 2008: § 
11-8a PBL] in a municipal master plan. Those zones should then be itemised in 
a zoning plan, visualising the special requirements or restrictions connected to 
that area, based on the Planning and Building Act or other pertinent regulations 
[ibid.: § 12-6 PBL].  As a consequence, areas with a potential exposition to ter-
rorism due to their functions or values could be identified in development plans 
and connected to special restrictions. This could contribute to improve security 
on a public level, for instance by the restriction on access to streets, used build-
ing materials, distances and so on. The identification ought to be realised by the 
legally fixed consultation of experts, like the National Security Agency (Nas-
jonal Sikkerhetsmynighet NSM) or the Police, especially the Norwegian Police 
Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste PST). The PST publishes an annual 
threat assessment (trusselvurdering), which gives advices both on the strategic 
level and in terms of risks of attacks on specific government officials, objects 
and events [Bech Gjørv et al.2012: 72]. Those experts could give advises in or-
der to decrease the vulnerability of the planned area, which should be consid-
ered in the design of the development plans. 
Security measures on a building level are regulated in the Security Act (sik-
kerhetsloven [Forsvarsdepartementet FD 1998]), in particular in chapter Five. 
This Act promotes the declaration of “skjermingsverdige objekter”, buildings 
which should be safeguarded against security imperiling threats due to their 
sensitive functions or values [ibid.: § 3-12 Sikkerhetsloven]. The owners of the 
buildings are in charge of proposing for this security status by illustrating the 
reasons for and level of protection. The National Security Agency is in charge of 
approval and supervision of those buildings [ibid.: §17; Bech Gjørv 2012: 419, 
Grønhaug/Buset, 2012]. Moreover the Act empowers the owner of the build-
ing to take care of its safeguarding against security imperiling threats. Security 
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measures, which should be used, are “en kombinasjon av barrierer, deteksjon, 
verifikasjon og reaksjon” [a combination of barriers, detectors, verification 
and respond][FD 1998: §17b Sikkerhetsloven]. The application of the law with 
regard to existing sites includes an identifictation and classification of those 
building until 01.01.2013 and the following safeguarding in line with §17b until 
01.01.2014 [Grønhaug/Buset, 2012]. Both the Planning and Building Act and the 
Security Act shape formal conditions in order to create a certain security level 
connected to buildings and public areas. Consequently a certain amount of se-
curity measures, especially in governmental and public buildings, can be found 
in Oslo [Skarholt 2012].  
4.3 Regjeringskvartalet – The Site
The Regjeringskvartalet is situated in the heart of Oslo, in walking distance to 
the central station and the parliament [Fig. 9].
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Figure 9: Location of the Regjeringskvartal in Oslo. Source: Own Figure, Own Pcture, 26.03.2012.
Its history began in 1883, when the area, consisting of wooden houses in tradi-
tional Norwegian building design called “Empirekvartalet” became the gov-
ernmental quarter of Oslo. In order to give the new governmental quarter an 
appropriate and modern urban design a design competition was held. [Jensen 
2012] The oldest governmental building , the building on Akersgata, also called 
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“G-blokka” or “Gamle Regjeringsbygg”, was the first building erected in 1904 
in Jugendstil-design by Henrik Bull. It was part of a larger ensemble, which has 
never been finished [Seip 2012a, Engh 2012]. In 1939 another design competi-
tion for the governmental area took place, which this time was won by Erling 
Viksjø. With the construction of the high rise, the “Høyblokka”, in 1956 the new 
Regjeringskvartalet was founded. The development was followed by the con-
struction of the “Y-Blokka (1969), the “S-Blokka” (1978), the “R4” (Governmental 
building number Four, 1988), the R5 (1996) and finally the R6, which was finished 
in June 2012 [Jensen 2012]. While the early buildings are connected to the archi-
tectural epoch of functionalism the buildings R4, R5 and R6 are constructed in a 
post-modern, ordinary office block design [Engh 2012]. However the Regjer-
ingskvartalet gave the town a very new look and great parts of the Empirekvar-
talet were demolished to make way for “the new symbol of the growing welfare 
state” [Morten 2011]. The Regjeringskvartalet concentrates all governmental 
functions and ministries except the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepar-
tamentet) and the Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet), which are lo-
cated close to the Akershus Festning [FAD 2012a]. The area inherits important 
administrative capital functions. 
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Figure 10: Map of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Own Figure, based on Google Maps.
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Up to the 22nd of July a national conservation plan (statlige verneplan) was 
in process assessing the conservation of parts of the Regjeringskvartalet due 
to their cultural, architectural and historical values. The buildings which were 
planned to be covered – though to different extends - by the Riksantikvarens 
[Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage] advice are the Høyblokka, the 
Y-,  G- and S-blokka, the building on Grubbegata 1, the R5, the building on Møl-
lergata 19 (M 19) and the old alley of trees - “Regjeringsparken” [Fig. 10]. [Rik-
santikvaren 2011] 
The heart of the area is the Høyblokka, the high rise. The Riksantikvaren [2011] 
underlines the importance and value of the building due to its architecture and 
its significance for Norway. It is attested to be a good example for Norwegian 
engineering and constructions. Both the used material – breccia -  and the ap-
plied construction process were unique and innovative. The design was influ-
enced by LeCorbusier and it was the first high rise in Oslo.  The sandblast art on 
the walls inside the building were designed by Pablo Picasso and Carl Nesjar 
and were a new way to present art in public space. The whole building is the 
example for the post-war architecture and a symbol for modernism in Norway. 
In terms of conservation values it stands in line with the castle (Det Kongelige 
Slott) and the Parliament (Stortinget).  [Riksantikvaren 2011, Hagberg 2012, Jen-
sen 2012, Holme 2011]
In charge for security matters in the Regjeringskvartalet is, according to the 
regulations [FD 1998: §17b Sikkerhetsloven], the owner of the buildings; the 
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (Fornyings-, 
administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet FAD). This includes the prevention of 
damages of the buildings, camera surveillance, entrance control and restric-
tions to streets. The execution is mainly realised by the subdivisions Statsbygg 
(the Norwegian Directorate of Public Construction and Property) and the De-
fense Security Service (DSS). Statsbygg is in charge for security measures con-
nected to building structure and DSS supplies guards and security services to 
the ministries [Bech Gjrøv 2012: 417]. Already before the incident of 22/7 there 
have been discussions security aspects in the area of the Regjeringskvartalet. 
The area is considered as the most symbolic and central administration unit in 
Norway [ibid: 57, 425]. The annual threat assessment (trusselvurdering) of 2004 
by the PST said, that a threat for the Regjeringskvartalet by islamist or right 
wing terrorists could be reasonable though the general threat level in Norway is 
quite low, but. This statement was confirmed in 2009 due to the terrorist attacks 
which happened in Europe after 2004. [ibid: 57]
The results of the report, especially the vulnerability analysis, showed, that the 
area was poorly protected against terrorist attacks, especially car bombings. 
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The police suggested to restrict the public access to the Grubbegata perma-
nently and for the Akersgata temporarily with movable bollards. Moreover they 
suggested improved object surveillance, break-proof windows and transit re-
strictions for the entrance area of the Høyblokka. Similar results were made by 
the National Security Agency. They also identified the Regjeringskvartalet as 
a sensitive, shield-worthy object (skjermingsverdig objekt), which should be 
protected against bombings by distance regulations, stronger building struc-
ture and break-proof windows. However the Agency was neither involved in the 
work on security improvement in the Regjeringskvartalet nor did it carry out a 
list of shield-worthy objects at all. Consequently the supervision of the FAD and 
the security works could not be realised, which might be the reason why the 
works have taken so long. [Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 423ff, 441f.]
The blocking of Grubbegata was planned from 2004 on, initiated by Staatsbygg 
and based on the legal framework of a zoning plan (reguleringsplan). The plan 
was approved by the PBE in October 2010, its realisation was planned for Sep-
tember/October 2011. [Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 433f.; Døvik 2011] To the time 
of the 22/7 incident, the street was not restricted at all, not even by temporary 
measures [Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 437]. However it is questionable if a blocked 
street would have prevented the terrorist attack [ibid.: 439]. 
Figure 11, 12: Bollards and Surveilance in the Regjeringskvartalet. Own Photos, 25.02.2012, 
12.11.2012.
In June 2011 the government carried out a risk- and vulnerability analysis (risiko- 
og sårbarhetsanalyse) for the Regjeringskvartalet. The results showed that the 
governmental quarter does not fulfill the latest security standards and does also 
lack a modern infrastructure system, just to mention the staircases, emergency 
exists, ventilation or energy standards. Especially the Y-blokka caused concerns 
due to its architecture and the pathways which are crossing beneath the build-
ing [FAD, 2012a]. The security system with its 200-300 CCTVs [Closed Circuit 
Television] of the area was installed in 1990. This was part of the construction 
works on the Høyblokka, where the building was extended by two additional 
floors on the top. These were used by the head of the state, the Prime Minister. 
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The first floor of the Høyblokka is made of glass and until 22/7 everybody could 
pass this floor. In 1989 bollards were installed in front of the entrance after a 
confused man drove his car straight into the entrance hall. [Jensen 2012] 
However the transit by passengers was still possible until 22/7, despite the po-
lice `s suggestions [Bech Gjørv 2012: 423ff.]. Though the police has detected 
several lacks in the security system and therefore a certain vulnerability of the 
Regjeringskvartalet, measures in order to reduce the vulnerability have not 
been handled with a high priority and their application took a lot of time – too 
much time in terms of the event of 22/7. Reasons are the lack of strategic com-
munication between the FAD and the responsible security authorities [Bech 
Gjørv et al. 2012: 441f.] and the general “manglende erkjennelse av risikoen” 
[lack of awareness of the risk] [ibid.: 443f.; Johansen/Sæther 2011]. Due to Rig-
mor Aasrud, Council of the FAD, the perceived sense of threat or danger did not 
exist among the employees of the Regjeringskvartalet, no one believed that an 
act of terrorism could ever happen in Norway. [Johansen/Sæther 2011] 
4.4 The 22nd of July and Its Consequences
On the 22nd of July, at 15:25 a car exploded in the centre of the Regjeringskvar-
talet at the back door of the Høyblokka. The car was equipped with a 950 kg ex-
plosive device, dropped by the 32 year old Anders Behring Breivik. The bomb 
caused the death of eight people and wounded more than 30. The area is the 
workplace for more than 2600 people, but fortunately only 190 were at work on 
that Friday afternoon. [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011] 
 
Figures 13, 14: Damages on the R4 (left) and 
the Høyblokka (above). Source: Statsbygg 2011, 
Available at http://www.statsbygg.no/Aktuelt/
Tema/Bilder-fra-Regjeringskvartalet/ [Ac-
cessed 10.12.2012]
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The pictures of the demolished area were broadcasted and printed all over the 
world – pictures of broken windows, collapsed walls and ceiling plates, pieces 
of glass and concrete wide spread across the area (cf. [NTB 2011B]). The Høy-
blokka, the Y- and S-blokka and the R4- building were hit hardest; all in all there 
has been a loss of 1500 working places and an area of 5.000m² has been de-
stroyed by the blast [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011].  
Breivik acted as a “lone wolf“, without being connected to a terrorist organi-
sation. He has been planning the attacks, both on the Regjeringskvartalet and 
the massacre on Utøya, for nine years. The motives for the attack are political. 
Breivik is a right-wing extremist; he intended to attack the political leadership 
of Norway, expressing his hate towards the social democrats (Arbeiderpartiet) 
and the ongoing “Islamization” of Norway. The attack on the Regjeringskvartalet 
as the symbolic and actual head of the state was targeted. [NTB 2011a] 
Immediately after the incidents in Oslo and Utøya both King Harald V and the 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg expressed their sympathy for the victims, 
thoughts and conclusions connected to the terrorist attack. King Harald was first 
and spoke to the Norwegian nation and the world already the day after the at-
tack. He [Harald V 2011] interprets the happenings as an attack on the Nor-
wegian society and democracy. Norway has been exposed to the challenge of 
showing strength and solidarity towards the Norwegian society and its values. 
“Jeg holder fast ved troen på at friheten er sterkere enn frykten.
Jeg holder fast ved troen på et åpent norsk demokrati og samfunnsliv.
Jeg holder fast ved troen på våre muligheter til å leve fritt og trygt i vårt 
eget land.”
[I cling to the belief that freedom is stronger than fear. I cling to the belief in an 
open Norwegian democracy and society. I cling to the belief in our ability to live 
freely and safely in our own country.] [ibid.]. Jens Stoltenberg held his speech in 
front of the city hall in the evening of the 25th of July to front of a crowd of 200.000 
people. In his speech [Stoltenberg 2011] he states that the people, the Norwe-
gian society, choose with their reactions how to continue after such a horrible in-
cident. They chose a way of openness. “Erobrer gatene, torgene – det offentlige 
rom med samme trassige budskap: Vi er sønderknust, men vi gir oss ikke.” [We 
conquer the streets and squares - the public space with the same defiant mes-
sage: We are broken, but we will not give up.] He wants to continue the course 
with the same, strong weapons Norway used before – free speech and democ-
racy. Even more he proclaims “mer åpenhet, mer demokrati” [more openness, 
more democracy][ibid.]. Both King Harald and Jens Stoltenberg, as the repre-
sentative and political leaders of Norway, have framed how Norway should react 
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on the terrorist attack, an attack which motives were political. The reactions of 
the population were strong and diversified, social platforms like Facebook and 
twitter drowned in feedback of their users. The trademark “Oslove”, a souvenir 
company founded in the 80ies [Hytten 2012], gained new attention and a new 
meaning. The money which is earned through the sale of shirts and wristbands 
with the logo of Oslove is supporting the Norwegian Red Cross [Oslove]. The 
logo of Oslove, which is now a synonym for “kjærlighet til hovedstaden vår, sam-
hold, likeverd og respect” [the love to Oslo, solidarity, equality and respect] 
[Hytten 2012], can be found on walls all over the town as well. These drawings, 
which appeared after the 22nf of July, serve as visual memories, expressing the 
sympathy for the victims and the support for Oslo, Norway and its policy [Fig, 
15, 16]. 
Figure 15, 16: Streetart in Oslo in respond to the terrorist attack. Source: Own Photos, 15.03.2012
After the first shock was settled in August, the clean-up of the area began under 
the responsibility of Statsbygg [Seip 2012b]. The Regjeringskvartalet was sur-
rounded by a high, wooden fence and
Figure 17: Security fence arround the Regjer-
ingskvartalet. Wholes made by Vulkan-Archi-
tects. Source: Photo by Falk Hanisch, 17.02.2012
 
closed for the public [Fig. 10, 17] 
[Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2011]. This 
impacted the behavior of the popula-
tion of Osloin this very area. Due to its 
location in the middle of the city the 
Regjeringskvartalet was frequently 
used as a transit area. One of the main 
bus lines in Oslo (line 37), which was 
passing Akersgata and stopped right 
in front of the Høyblokka, had to be 
detoured in a large scale. The minis-
tries and other governmental functions which were located in the quarter were 
moved to other buildings in interims solution. All in all twelve new addresses 
had to be found and checked on security issues by the police [FAD 2012a]. This 
has consequences for the workflow and daily routine of the employees, impact-
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ing the efficiency of governmen-
tal tasks. The terrorist attack 
caused not only the life and 
health of people and severe dam-
ages on the building structure. In 
the aftermaths it also cut the mo-
bility of the inhabitants of Oslo 
and their city, expressed by large 
detours and more required time 
to move through the city. The area 
of the Regjeringskvartalet, which 
used to be a transit area [Seip 
2012b; Engh 2012] was now hid-
den by a fence, not giving insight 
into the ongoing clean ups, just 
like an abandoned fortress which 
does not belong to the city any 
longer. Moreover can the terror-
ist attack be understood in a way 
that it was an attack on the build-
ing structure and therefore an – 
though unintended - attack on 
the heterogeneity, diversity and 
density which is expressed by 
the built environment and which 
is characteristic for the per-
ceived urbanity and quality of a 
town. The future development of the Regjeringskvartalet will show, if the his-
torically grown heterogeneity will disappear or if it will be preserved.
The work on the conservation plan was paused due to the damages on the build-
ing structure [Riksantikvaren 2011].
4.5 The Future of the Regjeringskvartalet
After the ministries were moved to interims offices and the clean up in the 
Regjeringskvartalet was started, the discussion about the future of the area be-
gan. In charge of this development is the FAD [Seip 2012] under the guidance 
of Rigmor Aasrud. In order to generate an idea how a future development of 
the Regjeringskvartalet can look like after those traumatic happenings, FAD 
18.12.2011: VG publishes an article about the plans for tearing down the 
Høyblokka, based on unmentioned sources and starts a public discussion 
about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet
Januar 2012: Vulkan architects put holes in the fences; more “openness” 
26.01.2012: Rigmor Aasrud (FAD) gives a presentation about the future of 
the Regjeringskvartalet, installation of a Blogg for the public
15.06.2011: R6 building is built, Regjeringskvartalet complete
06.07.2012: cleanups are finished; traffic can follow its former route
July 2012: winner of the “konseptvalgutredning” (KVU, concept study) are 
Metier AS, OPAK AS and ,LPO Arkitekter AS
22.07.2012: remembrance ceremony, speech of Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg
August 2012: Regjeringskvartalet opens for public transit
13.08.2012: 22. July Commission publish their report
2013: final decision about the future design of the Regjeringskvartalet 
TIMELINE of the REGJERINGSKVARTALET
Figure 18 : Timeline of the happenings in the Regjering-
skvartaet after the terrorist attack. Source: Own Figure. 
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requested expert opinions from the Riksantikvaren, the Police and Statsbygg 
already in October 2011 [Statsbygg 2012: 4]. Statsbygg [ibid.: 4] was requested 
to analyse aspects like security, psychological affects connected to the terror-
ist attack, working methods and the need for coordination between the minis-
tries and last but not least the assessment of architecture, art and conservation. 
Special considerations should be taken into the possible concentration of the 
governmental functions in the area of the Regjeringskvartalet, including the 
Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to fulfill this 
task, Statsbygg on its part requested the relevant documents from experts such 
as architects or psychologists. Also the responsible authorities in Germany and 
England were asked about their security standards for governmental buildings. 
Additionally a calculation about the costs of both demolition and reconstruction 
was made. The documents have been handed in in December and January 2012 
and will be part of the process of decision making. [Statsbygg 2012]
Meanwhile a discussion about the future development broke out in the media, 
caused by an article, which was published in VG. It obviously cited Rigmor Aas-
rud who was supposed to plan the demolition of the Regjeringskvartalet, es-
pecially the high rise [Johansen/Sæther 2011; Seip 2012b]. According to the 
article she did not want to make a solution without the experts’ advice, though 
her personal opinion speaks for the demolition due to economic and security 
aspects. This article was followed by a flood of statements by architects, the 
Riksantikvaren, researchers, security experts and others. They discussed the 
future of the Regjeringskvartalet – supporting either its reconstruction or its 
demolition. The aspects which were mainly named in this context are security 
and cultural heritage/memorial values, but also the functions and usage of the 
area, economic aspects and the process of the decision making itself. All fac-
tors are highly linked to each other; the future usage of the area determines the 
dimension of applied security measures, which influences the available space 
and impacts the urban design.
A. Security
The majority states that security should be an important aspect in the future of 
the Regjeringskvartalet, but there are differences about the priority of that as-
pect. The one side argues for a high amount of security, which – accordingly to 
the current building structure with its tunnels and outdated infrastructure - is not 
possible to realise at the current location. This justifies the dislocation of the gov-
ernmental functions, for example close to the castle, where a security infrastruc-
ture is already installed [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011; Listerud 2012; Kristiansen 
2012]. The other side argues for the concentration of all governmental functions 
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in the current area of the Regjeringskvartalet, but only with regard to improved 
security standards, which is a requirement by most of the employees of this area 
anyway (Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011; Kristiansen 2012]. The concentration of all 
those functions, which is also suggested by the police [Seehusen 2012a], allows 
more effective security solutions. Discussed in this context should also be the 
public access to the area, which has been used as a transit area for traffic and 
pedestrians. After the reopening of the area in August 2012 it is used as a transit 
area again, though motorised traffic is still excluded [Fig. 19, 20] [Larsen 2012]. 
Figures 19, 20 : Barriers on Akersgata to exclude the motorized traffic. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012. 
The closing of Grubbegata and Akersgata has already been discussed before 
and can be a strategy for the new development. This will, of course, have conse-
quences for the city and its population, as it already can be detected today 
(Wang-Narveen/Sandberg 2012]. Architects and experts on that field are afraid 
that the development of the Regjeringskvartalet will be similar to the develop-
ments of Ground Zero in New York, with the result of a fortress or over-secured 
castle in the middle of the town, which cannot be entered or passed between 16 
and 9 o`clock [Strand/Storvik 2012]. The security approaches have to be bal-
anced with an open and lively urban design, such as the whole city is based on. 
The architects of Snøhetta, a company which planned parts of Ground Zero in 
New York and the new Opera House in Oslo explained that “Denne grusomme 
handlingen bør ikke føre til at vi bygger festininger i stedet for et sivilt og hu-
mant samfunn.” [This cruel attack should not lead to the construction of fortress-
es instead of a civil and human society] [Jensen 2012]. Anders Grønli [Strande 
2012] points out that security does not necessarily have to mean the opposite of 
openness and refers to invisible security solutions, like the NOGOS, tiger traps 
and so on. 
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B. Cultural Heritage, Conservation, Lieu de Memoire
The initial statement of Rigmor Aasrud, who wanted to see the Høyblokka torn 
down [Johansen/Sæther 2012; Seip 2012b], encountered high resistance from 
experts such as architects and conservators. The conservation plan has not been 
assigned yet; there is no legal force for reconstruction from the conservations 
perspective. Moreover the Riksantikvaren [Roede 2012] states that a demolition 
of one or all buildings can be discussed, if the building structure is irreparably 
damaged. The investigations of the experts on the area showed that the build-
ings are damaged to different amounts. However the buildings which were on 
their way to be listed- Høyblokka, Y-blokka, G-blokka, R5 - are not damaged as 
severe, as a demolition would be necessary [Drevon 2012]. An exception is the 
S-blokka. Its conservation was planned as well, though restricted on the facades 
and only in line with second class conservation. The terrorist attack however 
caused such damage that a reconstruction seem to be unviable [Riksantikvaren 
2011; Seehusen 2012b]. In exception of the S-blokka the conservation values 
of the affected buildings have not changed [Holme 2011]. Even more, experts 
diagnose a certain symbolic significance which was gained after the attack. ”I 
kraft av at det har overlevd, er det blitt et livskraftig symbol for det motsatte 
av terror” [By the power of the fact that it has survived, it has become a viable 
symbol of the opposite of terror.][Jensen 2012]. A destruction of the area – that 
means the finishing of the terrorists plan - could create an even worse testimony 
[Jensen 2012; Østrem 2012]. It can be discussed, that  the symbolic significance 
today is not only positive [Ekland 2012]. On the other hand other buildings in 
Oslo – or Norway in general – were exposed to cruel and negative actions as 
well, especially by Nazi-Germany in the Second World War. Those buildings 
have not all been torn down either but had gotten a new, positive function and 
image instead [Ulstein 2012]. 
Figure 21 : Public Moaning at the Domkirka. 
Source: Photo by Irene Eskedal, July 2011.
Figure 22 : Showcase in front of the VG-Newspa-
per. Source: Own Photo, 25.02.2012. 
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When looking back in history the Empirekvartalet was demolished in order 
to make way for the new Regjeringskvartalet [Engh 2012]. Cultural Heritage 
had been destroyed and was replaced by – nowadays - historical and archi-
tectonical important buildings. Yet another demolition of the area implies an-
other loss of cultural heritage. Furthermore the whole area around the new and 
modern Regjeringskvartalet is unique itself. The old governmental building, the 
G-blokka, is listed and reconstruction goes on due to its former state. The old 
alley (Regjeringsparken) is a memorial for the Empirekvartalet. Right across 
the Y-blokka is the Trefoldighetskirka which was built in “Berlin Architecture”. 
The whole area merges 200 years of history [Drevon 2012]. The most important 
building, the Høyblokka, has never been a touristic sight at all, just like the whole 
governmental quarter, especially due to the lack of quality of public and green 
spaces [Skarholt 2012; Felberg 2012]. However the building is a symbol for Nor-
wegians, at least on a political level. It is a symbol for political power due to the 
fact, that the building hosts the Prime Minister`s Office and has always been a 
meeting place for the heads of the states or other important politicians [Engh 
2012; Seip 2012b; Riksantikvaren 2011]. It is a symbol for the Norwegian social 
democratic welfare state after the Second World War [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 
2012]. After the terrorist attack it can now also be a symbol for democracy: ”et-
ter 22.juli kan den også bli et symbol på demokratiet som ikke lot seg rive ned 
av terror” [Ulstein 2012]. The discussion about a memorial for the terrorist at-
tack can be mentioned in this context as well. The originally suggested location 
for the memorial was the Slottsparken, the Palace Park, but due to the missing 
linkage between the happenings of the 22nd of July and the very location the site 
has been rejected. The latest discussion states that the location for the memorial 
should be close to the site of the attack, in the Regjeringskvartalet [Seip 2012a; 
Bjørdal 2012]. 
This place has become a place of remembrance (“Lieu de Mémoire” [Seip 
2012a: 20]), a place of  collective  memory focused on a – in this case – geo-
graphic space. This applies especially for the population of Oslo and the Nor-
wegians in general, but also for international visitors and tourists due to the 
broadcasting of the 22nd of July [Ekland 2012]. The showcase in front of the VG-
Newspaper-Agency gained memorial values as well. The glass bursted due to 
the explosion, but has not been replaced until now, still showing the newspaper 
of the 22nd of July [Fig. 22].
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The awareness of the Regjeringskvartalet increased due to its symbolic sig-
nificance as the place, where the bomb exploded [Seip 2012b; Roede 2012]. It 
gained a memorial value [Ebbesen 2012], whether an actual memorial will be 
placed there or not and whether the area will be listed as cultural heritage or 
not [Ekland 2012]. This should be considered in the discussion about demolition 
or reconstruction. Even when some or all of the damaged buildings are going 
to be reconstructed, the usage of the area does not necessarily have to be the 
same as it has been before the attack [Seip 2012b].
C. Future Use
The discussion about the future usage of the area is mainly fed by security as-
pects and the emotional consternation of the employees of the area.  The recon-
struction under the latest security and infrastructure requirements will lead to 
the loss of offices and workplaces [Jensen 2012]. If the current use should be 
kept up, this will require the construction of new buildings or the alteration in 
use of other buildings in the area [FAD 2012a]. Also it is questionable, if the head 
of the state should still be located in the top of the building in the middle of the 
town [Johansen/Sæther 2012]. However there are advantages for keeping up 
the current use as a governmental area. Even more, the concentration of more 
governmental functions is discussed [Statsbygg 2012], irrespective of the urban 
design.  This could send out a clear message, especially towards the terrorist 
and his aim to attack the Norwegian head of the state. The government will not 
back down and hide in an over-secured fortress under the threat of a cruel mur-
derer but conquers back their workplaces at the terrorist site. The employees 
have been asked about their feelings of going back to a workplace which has 
been exposed to terrorism. The opinions are diversified; some do not want to go 
back, others want to go back if security is up to date. [Kristiansen 2012]. How-
ever the reconstruction (or new construction) of the area will take at least ten 
years: It should be considered how many of the employees will still be at work 
and if their opinion might not have changed over the years [Seip 2012b]. Under 
consideration of those aspects a new usage of the Regjeringskvartalet has been 
discussed. The alteration in use of especially the Høyblokka into a museum is 
among the ideas [Knap 2012]. It could become a political-historic museum for 
the 22nd of July, but also the moving of the highly disputed Munch Museum into 
this building has been discussed [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2012].  The top of 
the building could be used as a conference center or a restaurant [Knap 2012]. 
Also the usage for university facilities, student dorms or small apartment was 
recommended [Knap 2012; Listerud 2012; Ravnaas 2012].  Other voices do not 
support a change of functions and recommend a further administrative use [Jen-
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sen 2012]. 
As mentioned above the Regjeringskvartalet has become a place of remem-
brance and therefore a higher frequency of visitors and tourists in this area 
seems likely for the future. This requires special consideration for the usage, 
security level and design of the quarter. 
D. Economic Aspects
Economic aspects do also play an important role in the discussion about the 
future of the Regjeringskvartalet and the question of conservation or demolition 
[Seip 2012b]. Both alternatives will cost round about five to ten billion Norwe-
gian kroner [700 Mio – 1,4 Mrd. Euro] [FAD 2012a]. The reconstruction and re-
newal cause high costs due to the current security and infrastructure standards 
and moreover due to the removal of the asbestos [FAD 2012a; Roede 2012]. If the 
area is supposed to be used as a governmental quarter again, new offices and 
buildings have to be bought or built, additionally causing financial expenses. 
In comparison the demolition will probably not be much cheaper also, since 
the art has to be removed carefully and transported to a museum. The building 
itself cannot be blasted down because of the built environment and needs to be 
demolished floor by floor. [Roede 2012]
The usage of the area will impact the economic possibilities and influence the 
decision- making of the Regjeringskvartalet`s future. 
E. Process Design
There have also been statements how the process of decision making should 
look like. It seems obvious, that this special case requires special treatment 
since the decision will impact the face of Norway’s capital and will be watched 
not only by experts but also by the Norwegian population [Ebbesen 2012; Seip 
2012b], if not worldwide. In order to avoid overhasty, myopic or too emotional 
decisions the responsible authorities in charge should take all the time which is 
needed and involve as many stakeholders as necessary [Stige 2012; Ebbesen 
2012]. Stoltenberg’s demand for “More openness, more democracy” should also 
be visible in this process [Klem 2012]. The decision which is going to be made is 
not only about the damaged buildings, but also about the whole area in context. 
Especially the design of the public space will be important, since it connects 
the rest of the city with this special area [ibid]. If the quarter is used as govern-
mental quarter again, the public space needs an appropriate design to merge 
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both the special security requirements and the representative capital functions. 
Particular emphasis should be given to the “touristic” use due to the memorial 
functions. The wish for a design competition in order to guarantee a reasonable 
and transparent decision is huge among the experts [NTB 2012; Klem 2012]. The 
first step to open the area to the public and reduce its “fortress character” was 
made by the architects of Vulkan, who cut holes into the fences [Fig. 11] [Wang-
Naveen/Sandberg 2012]. 
After this discussion in the media Rigmor Aasrud [FAD 2012a; FAD 2012b] fi-
nally held a presentation on the 26th of January 2012 about the governmental 
ideas about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet. After a short overview about 
the history of the Regjeringskvartalet and the impacts of the terrorist attack she 
points out, which aspects should be taken care of in the future development. 
Those are security aspects, with special regard to the employees, conservation 
aspects (symbolic significance) and economic aspects. Further she defines the 
process of decision making and presents the chosen instrument – a central gov-
ernment land use plan (statlig reguleringsplan), which is based on § 6-4 PBL 
[MD 2008; Grøntunn 2012]. This instrument was chosen due to the fact, that the 
government has a certain interest in the project and because the significance 
of that project reaches far beyond the city limits [Seip 2012b; Engh 2012]. The 
Ministry of Environment (MD) will be in charge of the final decision making, but 
an intense cooperation with the urban planning authority of Oslo is legally fixed 
(§ 6-4 , para. 2 PBL).
Before the work on the central government land use plan is going to be start-
ed, the government decided to initiate a concept study (Konseptvalgutredning 
KVU) first in order to illustrate which future developments are possible [Fad 
2012a]. This kind of study is usually applied in advance to bigger projects, in 
particular when projects have a financial volume of at least 750 Mio kroner, 
which is the case here [Felberg 2012]. The concept study includes an analy-
sis of the future needs of the departments, a SWOT-Analysis, a feasibility study 
and the development of an overall concept, including security and economic 
aspects. This concept should include at least three different alternatives of how 
the new Regjeringskvartalet could look like. It should analyse the demolition 
and new construction of the area, the reconstruction of the damaged buildings 
and a solution in between, but with the restriction of the concentration of all 
governmental functions in the area. Also the inclusion of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Environment into the new Regjeringskvartalet should 
be discussed within the concept study. By that the government has made its 
decision to maintain the governmental function in the current area and to keep 
the Regjeringskvartalet`s use. This decision is made with regard to security as-
pects, but also due to work organisation of the ministries. Both the police [Politi-
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direktoratet 2012] and Statsbygg [Statsbygg 2011] are supporting this decision. 
[FAD 2012a]
Before the concept study is handed to the authority in charge, the FAD, it 
will be appraised by an extern independent expert for quality management 
(Kvalitetssikring, KS1) [Grøntunn 2012].  The call for proposals to carry out this 
concept study was won by Metier AS, OPAK AS and LPO Arkitekter, who will 
work on the study until June 2013 [Engh 2012]. Pål Henry Engh, architect of LPO 
Arkitekter, explains [ibid.] that the concept study is done in “several thematic 
groups”, whereby one group deals with “references”: international case studies 
and investigations of other cities and their solutions for governmental functions 
and security. Moreover he defines the three objectives of the concept study: “the 
creation of secure working places, the creation of an open urban situation and 
finally the integration of the historical-symbolic values and capital functions”.
A final solution for the development of the Regjeringskvartalet - the basis for the 
central government land use plan - by the FAD is expected for summer 2013. It 
is not anticipated that the final result will be appreciated by all stakeholders, but 
an open, transparent and democratic process may lead to a higher acceptance 
by all who are affected [FAD 2012a]. The documents, which were handed in to 
FAD by Statsbygg, the Police and the Riksantikvaren, are public and will be part 
of the concept study. In order to involve the population and non-experts into the 
process as well, a blog [FAD 2012c] was established online until April 2012. 
Complete recon-
struction 
Partial recon-
struction and 
demolition
Demolition of all 
damaged buildings
Usage Regjeringskvartalet: governmental and capital functions
Urban design Complete recon-struction of the 
Regjeringskvar-
talet, as it has been 
before the terrorist 
attack
Some buildings 
will be recon-
structed, some 
will be demol-
ished due to their 
architectural 
value and grade 
of damage,  Re-
placement of 
the demolished 
buildings by 
more functional 
and efficient 
buildings
Complete demolition 
and new construc-
tion, new architecture 
with environmental 
friendly and more ef-
ficient and integrated 
infrastructure and 
security solutions, 
increased functional-
ity, improved work 
organisation
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Security more buildings with governmental func-
tions, more restric-
tions on access of 
public space and 
streets  due to secu-
rity measures, Y-
Blokka and its lack 
of security has to be 
solved
Integration of se-
curity system in 
existing buildings 
and in new build-
ings, area itself 
has same expan-
sion,  restrictions 
for access to 
public space and 
streets will be 
small
Modern and integrat-
ed security systems, 
space saving, less 
restrictions on access 
to on public space 
and streets
Cultural Heritage Listed as planned before 22/07, archi-
tecture as a mile-
stone for post war 
functionalism, art 
of Y- and H-blokka 
will be conserved, 
Viksjø`s most im-
portant buildings 
will stand
Keeping of the 
most important 
buildings (e.g. 
conservation 
class 1), conser-
vation of Viksjø`s 
idea and sym-
bolic buildings, 
demolition of 
minor valuable 
buildings and 
replacement by 
new, modern ar-
chitecture
No conservation, loss 
of cultural heritage 
and important and 
familiar buildings, 
los of Viksjø`s idea, 
reuse of single ele-
ments in new design 
possible
Economy Renovation and modernization of 
technical and secu-
rity infrastructure, 
due to special ca-
pacities: construc-
tion or buying of 
new offices
Renovation and 
modernization, 
demolition and 
construction of 
new offices and 
workplaces
Complete demolition 
step by step due to 
the dense built en-
vironment, removal 
and conservation of 
the art pieces, new 
construction under 
new standards
Table 4: Possible Alternatives for the Future Urban Design of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: own 
figure, based on [FAD 2012a] 
Table 4 shows the alternatives with regard on security, cultural heritage and 
economy which should be analysed within the concept study. 
The first alternative will be the complete reconstruction of the Regjeringskvar-
talet as it has been before the terrorist attack. The cultural heritage will be taken 
care off in its most comprehensive way, with the consequence that new build-
ings will be necessary in order to concentrate all the governmental functions 
in the area. This will require more space to fulfill the safeguarding with signifi-
cant restrictions in the public space for the mobility of the passengers, both by 
car, public transport or by foot. Also the work organisation for the governmen-
tal functions will fall off in quality due to longer communication channels. The 
employees also might have emotional concerns by going back to the “same” 
workplace where nothing appears to have changed. The interpretation of this 
alternative could be negative; the urban design shows that the terrorist has nev-
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er been here but the security measures might create a negative, fortress-like 
perception. The visible restrictions due to security will maybe make everyone 
over-aware of the obvious need for security due to the horrible event of the past 
and will therefore remind of the terrorist attack in an even more negative way, 
instead of showing, that the terrorist was not able to fulfill his cruel intentions. 
In contrast the most radical alternative includes the whole demolition of the 
Regjeringskvartalet and the constructions of new buildings. With this solution 
modern security and infrastructure systems can be integrated into the build-
ings. The buildings will be designed environmentally friendly, space saving and 
efficient, which will also have positive synergies for the work organisation of 
the employees. However this solution will also mean the complete loss of the 
cultural heritage, with its identity and architectural and symbolic significance, 
especially for the Høyblokka. The area, which is now familiar to the population 
who is passing it every day, will get a complete new design which maybe will 
be followed by the loss of its memorial values. Buildings, which were about to be 
listed, are going to be demolished. This implies a big cut from a conservations 
point of view, which can be traced back to a terrorist attack. This alternative will 
destroy the grown heterogeneity of the area and include the creation of a new, 
in somewhat homogeny governmental quarter. It could mean a loss of diversity 
and therefore a loss of urban quality. It is questionable if this should be the an-
swer given to the happenings of the 22nd of July. 
A good solution seems to be a compromise between a complete reconstruc-
tion and a complete demolition of the Regjeringskvartalet. The most historical 
and architectural valuable buildings, Viksjø`s design idea, can be conserved; 
among those the Høyblokka with its political – and now memorial – significance. 
Unfunctional, damaged and less valuable buildings, like the S-blokka or the R4, 
can be demolished and replaced by new, environmental friendly, space saving 
solutions. This architecture can respond to security requirements and the loss 
of workplaces, which will be the result of the renewal of the Høyblokka. This 
compromise balances all the aspects, which were discussed in the aftermaths 
of the terrorist attack. The memorial significance will remain thus as the area 
shows that it has faced a horrible incident but has tuned into something positive 
without forgetting or ignoring the past. Security aspects will be taken care of 
but to an amount that both the governmental employees and passengers or visi-
tors can feel comfortable. The interpretation of the area can be positive though 
something that cruel and negative had happened. 
The costs for all three alternatives will be around five to ten billion Norwegian 
kroner. Such a huge project should be designed most efficient for sustainability`s 
sake. This should be considered within the decision making as well. The chal-
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lenge will be balancing conservation values, memorial values, security and 
economic aspects [Seip 2012b; Engh 2012]. 
4.6 Impacts on Urban Planning
What has changed in the aftermaths of the terrorist attack with special to urban 
planning? Since the 22/7-incident happened just one year ago, it is not possi-
ble to name specific changes [Seip 2012; Voss Gabrielsen 2012; Skarholt 2012]. 
Therefore this will be an attempt, to illustrate the urban planning’s` respond to 
the attack and possible changes in its course which can be detected already 
now. The focus here will lay on security aspects and the role of cultural heritage/
conservation values in urban development.
From the experts point of view a change in the regulations, that implies the Plan-
ning and Building Act, is not planned, or initiated, neither by the Planning Au-
thority nor by the superior ministry in charge [Skarholt 2012, Grøntunn 2012]. 
Therefore a change in the planning process, which is fixed in the Planning and 
Building Act is hard to identify. The fact that a reconsideration of current projects 
with regard to new security requirements did not happened so far supports this 
statement. [Engh 2012; Skarholt 2012; Seip 2012]
However security in general became more important. This is not only detect-
able in the discussion and plans of the new Regjeringskvartalet but also in the 
discussions between the police and the government about the future security 
policy, which focuses on the prevention of terrorist attacks and the improvement 
in reacting on such an attack [Engh 2012; Seip 2012]. This is to be seen in con-
nection to the report, which was published by the 22.July Commission (cf. [Bech 
Gjørv et al. 2012]) and which diagnosed a lack of security by analysing the hap-
penings of the 22nd of July. An increased appearance of security (guards, surveil-
lance, entrance controls) can now be identified around governmental buildings; 
that is to say around Akershus Festning, the interims office for Jens Stoltenberg, 
and the other compensatory offices for the departments and ministries, which 
were located in the Regjeringskvartalet. Besides that, there is no higher secu-
rity level in public spaces, at least not perceptive for the citizens.[Seip 2012]. It 
is assumed that considerations will be carried out where the report identified 
deciencies. In matters of urban planning the report states that an appropriate 
legal framework is at hand, covered by the Planning and Building Act and its 
possibilities to regulate certain security needs and the Security Act (object se-
curity). Also the risk and vulnerability of the Regjeringskvartalet was clearly 
expressed by the Police`s risk assessment. Moreover the report diagnosed a 
lack of application of the available instruments [Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 444]. No 
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building has been identified as “skjermingsverdig” [sensitive, shield-worthy] 
until 22/7 and therefore its appropriate protection against e.g. terrorist attacks 
could not have been checked by the National Security Agency [ibid.: 441f.]. 
Reasons were – next to others – the lack of awareness of threat by the depart-
ments in charge. Now, after the incident of 22/7, this awareness will change most 
likely. It already changed for the Regjeringskvartalet, which can be seen in the 
discussion about the future development. Moreover the decision to apply the in-
strument of a central government land-use plans will in accordance to the Plan-
ning and Building Act include the implementation of the risk and vulnerability 
assessment. Also advices made by the police or the National Security Agency 
will most likely be included in the plan due to the regulations for consultation. 
If this priority of security is only applied because the development deals with 
the very site of the attack or if this is a priority which will be considered in ur-
ban planning developments in general is a question, which cannot be answered 
at this point. The report [Bech Gjørv et al. 2012: 442] points out, that Norway 
did not apply visual security measures and physical barriers so far, which is an 
“expression for an open, democratic society”. On the other hand the aspiration 
for “more openness, more democracy” should not mean that the protection of 
certain buildings and their functions is not important. In contrast its protection 
guarantees an resilient society, even in events of threat or crisis. In fact, an in-
creased security in general is wanted by both architects and citizens. [Jensen 
2012; Wernersen 2012, Molaug 2012]
Also the active role of urban planning in this context is to be analysed. As men-
tioned before the actual identification of sensitive, shield-worthy buildings and 
the defection of their level and art of protection are the tasks of the experts on 
security issues, like the NSM or the police – either in general or together with 
the owners and investors of the buildings to be planned or areas to be devel-
oped. The interface between this sectoral planning and the urban planning is 
reduced to the compilation of development plans. As mentioned above the role 
of urban planners under the neo-liberal influence is not very active, that is to say 
that plans are in general not initiated by the planning authority but by investors. 
If security matters have not already been considered in the early, pre-formal 
planning stadium they will first be considered within the consultation of public 
agencies. This can lead to long planning processes.
Just because the terrorist attack impacted a cultural heritage it is questionable, 
if this will lead to a significant change in the future urban planning policy. and 
its attitude towards cultural heritage. The discussion about the Regjeringskar-
talet has shown the different opinions about the consideration of conervation 
values in general. According to the experts [Seip 2012, Molaug 2012] cultural 
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heritage always had an inferior role to e.g. economic aspects in urban planning 
development. The latest news from the ministry in charge of cultural heritage 
– the Ministry of Environment (MD) – stated [Nipen 2012] that a change in the 
consideration of values or cultural heritage is most likely in the next years. That 
includes especially the increased listing of buildings, which are witnesses of 
the industrial, international and urban Norway, even when local authorities and 
owners do not support this [ibid.]. If this new attitude is a result of the terrorist 
attack on a cultural heritage is not evident. 
The future will show how strong the neo-liberal influence on Oslo`s urban plan-
ning really is, how a decision between planners, politicians and investors can 
look like and how this will impact the overall planning concept.
4.7 Preliminary Results
Today, urban planning is characterised by a strong neo-liberal influence, where 
most of the development projects are initiated by investors. Therefore partici-
pation of the population, which is basically realised through the consultation of 
politicians, takes place at a very advanced state of the planning process and is 
– in spite of its recognised importance – negatively perceived by planners and 
investors. The cities overall concept refers to Oslo`s location between the Fjord 
and the Marka and promotes an urban development of agglomeration/densifi-
cation within the city limits. The biggest projects today reflect this concept, and 
also the international influence which is detectable in the urban design all over 
the town. Both security and cultural heritage played an inferior role in urban 
planning especially in comparison to economic aspects. 
If this terrorist attack has impacted or will impact the urban planning is ques-
tionable. Most likely security considerations will get more weight in future proj-
ects. However the urban planning authority is dependent on the consultation of 
security experts like the NSM or the police, when it comes to the identification 
of buildings and areas which need more protection than others due to their val-
ues and functions for the society. Finally the realization of security measures 
connected to buildings is not the task of the urban planning authority but of the 
owners, who are supervised and guided by the NSM. The regulations to ensure 
a certain level of security had already been at hand before the terrorist attack. 
Therefore changes in the legislation or the course of urban planning are not 
likely and no tendencies towards this direction can be identified now. Neither 
have the current projects been reconsidered so far. Even with an increase in 
security measures, especially connected to public, “shield-worthy” buildings a 
“fortification” of Oslo it not likely. Both the urban planning authority, the politi-
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cians, the architects and the experts on security refuse an over-secured public 
space and emphasis the balance between reasonable security measures and an 
open, accessible urban space. This refers to the socio-political background of 
Norway, which is enshrined in the constitution, promoting strong human rights 
and solidarity. The attack has impacted this background in so far as both the 
King and the Prime Minister emphasise those values and – even more – pro-
claim a more open and democratic society.
The discussion about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet has shown that both 
security and memorial and conservation values are important aspects, which 
should be considered in the future design. Whereas cultural heritage values 
have always been a matter of discussion in Oslo, the discussion about security 
is new. It is connected to the terrorist attack, which was the first incident of that 
kind that has happened in Norway’s post-war history. In how far these aspects 
are considered and integrated in the final design will be an open question until 
at least summer 2013. The design will be realised on basis of a central govern-
mental zoning plan, expressing the national importance of the development. 
Also a consultation and hearing of as many public authorities or other impacted 
persons is underlined. This includes also the consultation of other countries and 
their safeguarding solutions. 
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5 Oklahoma City & Manchester
In this chapter the two cases of Oklahoma and Manchester will be analysed. As 
stated before, the cases were chosen due to the high level of similarity with the 
Oslo case.  Both cities had to deal with terrorist attacks, targeted at public build-
ings and carried out by car bombs. 
This chapter will analyse the impacts the incidents had on both the urban plan-
ning and the site. Special consideration will be given to the redesign of the site 
and the integration of security and memorial and conservation values.    
5.1 Oklahoma City
Oklahoma City is the capital of the state of Oklahoma, located in the south central 
region of the United States of America. Oklahoma City is inhabited by 540.000 
citizens and governed by a Republican mayor. [City of Oklahoma City 2012b] 
Figure 23: One Nation Under CCTV, Banksy-Art in London. Source: Photo by Kristian Kotilainen, 2009
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On the 19th of April in 1995 the right wing extremist Timothy McVeil drove his 
van straight into the entrance hall of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City. After McVeil left the area, the bomb placed in the van exploded 
causing the death of 168 citizens and injuring more than 680. Among the victims 
were governmental employees and nineteen children. Half of the building was 
destroyed due to the blast, many buildings in the near environment 
Figure 24: The effects of the Oklahoma City Bombing. 
Source:  [FEMA 2007: 1-22]
were affected as well [Fig. 24, 25]. 
McVeil targeted this building, 
which among others hosted the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, due to personal 
anti-government reasons. [Lewis 
2000: 201; Gabriel 2010: 133]
As stated before the Alfred P. Mur-
rah building was heavily dam-
aged due to the explosion. The 
building was constructed in 1977 
and covered an area of 3.3 acres 
(13.355m²). The remained building 
structures were demolished on the 
23rd of May in 1995 by implosion. 
[Oklahoma City National Memorial 
& Museum 2012]
Shortly in the aftermaths of the at-
tack the decision fell to erect a me-
morial on site. The wish for creating a place of remembrance arose not only 
because the site, turned into a “makeshift memorial”, surrounded by a fence 
and covered with flowers, stuffed animals, pictures and letters already in the 
first hours after the attack. However the Mayor of Oklahoma City established the 
Oklahoma City National Memorial task force, who carried out a Mission State-
ment in March 1996, including elements and aspects which should be consid-
ered in the design of the memorial. This report included broad participation 
from the victims and their families, to acknowledge their wishes of what the 
memorial should express. [Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum 2012]
In order to find an appropriate design for the memorial a design competition 
was carried out. Hans and Torrey Butzler won the competition in 1997 out of 
624 international competition entries. The memorial costed 29 Million dollars 
and was paid for by governmental contributions together with private donation. 
The memorial covers the whole 3,3 acres, but also the next block which was 
53The Case Study of Oslo
Figure 25: The destroyed Alfred  P. Murrah Build-
ing. Source:  [FEMA 2007: 1-5]
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Figure 26:  The Oklahoma City National Memo-
rial and Museum. Source: Oklahoma City Na-
tional Memorial & Museum, available at: http://
www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/sec-
ondary.php?section=1 [Accessed 10.12.2012]
Figure 27:  Map of the Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum and the new Oklahoma City 
federal Building. Source:  Own Figure, based on Google Maps., GSA 2001, Oklahoma City National 
Memorial & Museum.
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also affected by the attack. The street, which is located between the two blocks 
(Fifth Street) is closed for traffic as well as integrated into the design concept 
– despite public protest. The area of the former street is now covered with the 
“reflecting pool”. The entrance and exit of the memorial are marked by the two 
giant “Gates of Time”. The site were the Alfred P. Murrah building once stood 
is framed by a grassy footprint. Placed on this footprint are 168 chairs made of 
bronze and glass and illuminated at night. They symbolise the 168 victims of 
the terrorist attack. Parts of the makeshift memorial - the construction fence, are 
also integrated into the design. Other elements of the memorial are the “Sur-
vivor Tree” and the museum, which is located in the neighboring block of the 
former Alfred P. Murrah building (Journal Record Building) [Fig. 26, 27]. Exactly 
5 years after the attack, the memorial was inaugurated by President Bill Clinton 
who declared the whole site as “sacred ground”. The Oklahoma City National 
Memorial is designed in a minimalistic way, similar to many other memorials in 
the United States and worldwide. The reason for using this design element is the 
“participating and experiential dimension” of this style. Audience participation 
in the Oklahoma City National memorial is a way of dealing with the trauma of 
the attack. The visitors can “work through” their feelings which arose through 
the attack. The memorial, like many memorials, is a touristic anchor.[Doss 2010: 
123ff, 137f]
The history of terrorism against the United States is characterised by attacks on 
embassies in Africa or the Middle East. Terrorist attacks on US soil were an in-
frequent occurrence before the first attack on the World Trade Center in New 
York in 1993[FEMA 2007:1-21]. The Oklahoma City Bombing is claimed to be 
the largest attack on solid ground within the United States of America since the 
Second World War and until the incident of 9/11 in 2001 [Gabriel 2010: 133]. 
Especially those two terrorist attacks - The Oklahoma bombing and 9/11- in-
creased the awareness of domestic terrorism, causing vehement discussion of 
the topic both in politics, media and public. Although, the biggest impacts can 
be seen on the politic level. In the aftermaths of the Oklahoma City Bombing the 
running President, Bill Clinton, brought the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Law (AEDP) into action. This equipped the security agencies in charge 
with more terrorism fighting rights – e.g. expanded surveillance etc. The Law 
was first refused due to the concerns about “curtailing civil liberties”[Gabriel 
2010: 135ff]. In order to pass this law threat-raising instruments were used, just 
because the public awareness did not see a necessity for the law. Consider 
revising above two sentences to make clearer. “The governmental accent on 
counter-terrorism reflects the concern of government officials, rather than the 
public’s concern”. [Lewis 2000: 207f]
The law is to be seen in the bigger context of the U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy, 
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approved in “PDD 39”, which includes the use of “all appropriate means to de-
ter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks. PDD 39 directs all federal depart-
ments and agencies to take measures to (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, 
(2) deter and respond to terrorism, and (3) develop effective capabilities to pre-
vent and manage the consequences of terrorism“ [The White House 1995]. The 
incident of 9/11 led to the “Global War on Terrorism” – an even more interfering 
policy of the United States. Terrorism is seen as a threat to “freedom”, “democ-
racy” and “civilization” and the answers are a “radical securitization of cities 
and aggressive military action across the world” [Graham 2007].
Though the Oklahoma City National Memorial is supposed to help to deal with 
the traumatic effects after the attack it does hardly discuss questions of how 
and why all those people had to die. The absence of context is relevant for 
the Oklahoma City National Memorial, but also for other US memorials. Bevan 
[2006: 199] speaks in this context of “false memorials”, which are used by the 
US government to demonstrate the existence of a terrorist threat and to promote 
and justify governmental security measures. The people who died due to ter-
rorist attacks, like in Oklahoma or 9/11, are in fact innocent, but “their deaths 
were manipulated to sustain politicized assumptions of American national inno-
cence and to legitimate national security narratives of revenge and retribution” 
[Doss 2010: 153]. The Oklahoma City bombing was called an “insane act of a 
social deviant, not the rehearsed performance of a decorated Gulf War veteran” 
[ibid:122]. Due to the missing “reflection on issues of historical responsibility” 
[ibid: 122], the attack is claimed to be a national attack against America, which 
further fuels the fear of terrorism [ibid.:147]. However there is a discrepancy 
between the perceived threat of the government and the perceived threat of the 
population. The terrorist attack of Oklahoma City raised in fact the “awareness 
of an insecurity about domestic terrorism”. However, “the public’s apparent risk 
assessment” [Lewis 2000: 202f] shows, that this awareness does not necessarily 
have to result in a changed personal behavior or life routine. Also it is expressed 
that the personal vulnerability in case of a terrorist attack is evaluated as high, 
however the actual risk of an attack in contrast is perceived as low and unlikely. 
The same can be stated for the population’s behavioral reaction after the inci-
dent of 9/11. E.g. people still use the subway despite the federal government 
labeling this activity with high risk potential. [Lewis 2000: 202f; Marcuse 2007] 
This US Anti-Terrorism policy was applied in matters of urban planning as well. 
Before 1995 there have been no standards for the construction of federal build-
ings. In charge “for the design and construction of [federal] buildings, and for 
alterations and repairs to existing facilities” is the General Service Admission 
with its Public Building Sector (PBS). “One of its primary goals has always been 
to assure the physical safety of federal employees who work in, and the private 
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citizens who visit, government-owned or leased buildings”[Smith 2007: 2]. After 
the incident of Oklahoma City the government assigned the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) to carry out a vulnerability study (“Vulnerability Assessment report“) 
for federal buildings in order to develop minimum security standards. Two com-
missions have been established; the Professional Commission, which analysed 
the current security state of federal buildings and the Standard Commission, 
among others composed of the GSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
and the Secret Service. The Standard Commission carried out a classification 
of security levels for governmental owned buildings due to their size, number 
of employees and public access and in addition with special national security 
considerations. Moreover they defined a list of minimum standard security mea-
sures according to the required security level [ibid..2ff]. The list includes physi-
cal security measures and urban design advices, all in all “52 security standards 
dealing with such items as perimeter parking, lighting, physical barriers and 
closed circuit television monitoring.  Standards were also recommended for se-
curity at entrances and exits, employee and visitor identification, and the opera-
tion of day care centers”[Department of Justice 1995]. Many of the measures 
which are mentioned in chapter 2.4 (Security in Architecture) were already de-
veloped in the aftermaths of the Oklahoma City bombing and can be found 
in this guideline. The destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Building was classified as a 
Level IV-building, which would have justified higher security measures, than it 
had been applied [ibid.]. However the guideline addresses the modernization 
and alteration of existing facilities. In order to cover the new design of federal 
buildings as well the GSA carried out a guide about “Draft Security Criteria” 
in 1997. This work then was overtaken by the Interagency Security Committee 
(ISC) and its “Security Design Criteria for New Federal Buildings and Major 
Modernization Projects” from 2001 [Smith 2007: 2ff.]. The ISC was founded also 
in 1995, six months after the Oklahoma City Bombing, with the purpose “to en-
hance the quality and effectiveness of physical security in, and the protection 
of buildings and nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States. The ISC stan-
dards apply to all nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States; whether 
government-owned, leased or managed; to be constructed or modernized; or to 
be purchased” [Department of Homeland Security 2012].
The biggest impacts which followed the bombing and consequently the new 
requirements in urban design can be seen in the design of surface parking lots, 
freestanding parking garages and the setback (“stand-off”) of federal buildings 
[Dixon 2012: 3]. The new Oklahoma City Federal Building was erected close 
to the site of the terrorist attack [Fig. 27], considering the new security guide-
lines, introduced by the GSA. The new building is a “national symbol of strength 
and resilience”, combining both security and an “open, accessible and invit-
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ing” architecture in line with “the democratic principles” of the United States 
[GSA 2012]. Security measures which were implemented into the new design 
included elements such as; “building mass and setbacks, bollards, and glazing 
inside the courtyard” [GSA 2001].  
The work of GSA and later on ISC addresses federal buildings and other na-
tional icons. The coverage of public-private developments was not too devel-
oped until the incident of 9/11. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center 
and the traumatic results of this incident increased the awareness of risk and 
vulnerability of terrorism in the United States and also worldwide. Among oth-
ers the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which mainly dealt 
with the mitigation of natural hazards, so far have published guidelines in their 
Risk Management Series (RMS) in order to mitigate terrorist attacks as well. The 
first publication was released in 2003, called “FEMA 426 – Reference Manual to 
Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks” (updated in 2012, cf. [FEMA 2012]), which 
was detailed in “FEMA 430 – Site and Urban Design for Security” (cf. [FEMA 
2007]). These guidelines are based on the design criteria made by the GSA 
and ISC but also include strategic concepts for risk and vulnerability assess-
ment. Besides the mitigation of terrorist attacks, the guidelines aim to balance 
the security needs with the “site amenities and aesthetic quality in urban and 
semi-urban areas” in order to avoid design mistakes which were performed in 
the very aftermaths of 9/11. Nevertheless the guidelines are not mandatory and 
not implanted in building codes. [FEMA 2007: i; 1-1ff] 
The enacting of building codes is a matter of the federal states. However there is 
an “International Building Code”, which should work as a role building code for 
the single states. The ICB does not regulate explicit elements of urban design 
or site perimeter with regard to security [Thompson/Bank 2007: 66] but pro-
motes the establishment of ”the minimum requirements to safeguard the public 
health, safety and general welfare through structural strength, means of egress 
facilities, stability, sanitation, adequate light and ventilation, energy conserva-
tion, and safety to life and property from fire and other hazards attributed to 
the built environment and to provide safety to fire fighters and emergency re-
sponders during emergency operations.” [State of Oklahoma 2006: §103] In fact, 
most federal building codes do not modify the IBC on many points. Urban Plan-
ning in Oklahoma, including Oklahoma City, is based on the IBC with only few 
modifications [City of Oklahoma 2012; State of Oklahoma 2006]. As it appears 
no explicit changes were implemented after the Oklahoma City Bombing. The 
current amendment of the ICB deals with the lessons learned out of the 9/11 in-
cident. Security considerations with regard to the construction of tall buildings 
will be implemented in the 2012-edition of the ICB. [Drengenberg/Coley 2011: 
32ff]
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The consequences for urban design which are detectable after the terrorist at-
tacks – not only Oklahoma but also 9/11, are a “militarization and securitiza-
tion of urban space” [Graham 2007], coming along with “hardenen architec-
ture” and the “restrict[ed] […] use of public space” [Marcuse 2007, also Savitch 
2008:134f.]. This stands in contrast to the behavior of the citizens in the Ameri-
can cities. Their “fundamental character […] - open, free-wheeling, striving, 
competing, diverse—is very much as it was before [the attacks][Eisinger 2004: 
127]. Though it is questionable if this behavior is realised because or in spite of 
the increased safeguarding in urban designs [Lewis 2000: 207]. 
5.2 Manchester
Manchester is located in the northwest of England, and with a population of 
500.000 and a metropolitan region of about 2.3 million people, it is one of 
England´s most important cities. As the world´s first industrial city, urban plan-
ning in Manchester in post-modern times was characterised by the challenge 
of dealing with both the change of the economic basis and the consequences of 
urban growth. In order to succeed in this challenge the private and the public 
sector have been working together. In order to meet the urban development 
goals under the term of “Urban Regeneration” the instrument of public private 
partnerships is proven to be most effective [William et al. 2000: 295f; Kitchen 
2001:332]. 
On the 15th of June in 1996 this development was interrupted by the bomb-
ing of the city centre. Responsible for this act of terrorism was the IRA. It was 
their second attack on Manchester within four years. The IRA placed a van, 
filled with 1.500kg of explosives (the biggest bomb since the 2nd World War) 
close to the “Arndale” shopping centre and subsequently detonated the pay-
load.  As a result of the IRA warning media and hospitals 75 minutes in advance, 
some 80.000 people were successfully evacuated by the police and responsible 
emergency organisations. No fatalities 
were reported, although more than 
200 people were injured mainly due to 
broken glass [Kitchen 2001: 328; Moss 
2011]. The blast could be felt kilome-
ters away and glass broke within a half 
kilometer radius [William et al. 2000: 
298]. The consequences for the sur-
rounding building structure were im-
mense. The Arndale Centre was com-
Figure 28:  The destroyed Arndale-Shopping 
Centre. Source:  [Fema 2007: 1-24]
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pletely destroyed with  nearby buildings also receiving damage.  A total of more 
than 100.000m² of retail and office square was lost, with major consequences for 
the economy.  More than 627 businesses were displaced, with substantial conse-
quences for employees and employers due to the loss of workplaces. The centre 
has been the city’s most important source of income since the transformation to 
the post-industrialism system. Consequently the insurance claim is about 700 
million dollars. [Savitch 2008: 162; Kidd 2004: 69]
The IRA maximised the bombs impact by specific timing and placement, inten-
tionally targeting the popular civilian Saturday morning shopping period. The 
effectiveness of the bomb was further increased due to a large influx of people 
into town which were attracted by events of the European football championship 
[Kitchen 2001: 327].
Terrorist attacks of the IRA have the longest history in domestic urban territory 
bombing worldwide. Since the 1960’s the targets of the IRA were focused on 
infrastructure and the “symbol of UK economic might” [Bevan 2006: 69f]. Such 
symbols included the City of London, the London Docklands and shopping cen-
ters in Warrington – and Manchester [ibid.]. The city centre of Manchester con-
tains various significant functions, making it particularly vulnerable to terrorist 
attack. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the main tasks were to restore 
those significant functions both in short and in long term.  In order to support 
the retailers in the short term during the time of no business activity, the Lord 
Mayor´s Appeal Fund was raised [Kidd 2004: 68]. The City Council being the 
authority responsible for Urban Planning in Manchester, established the “Man-
chester Millennium Ltd.”. This consisted of a public private partnership which 
was supposed to guide the long term redevelopment process [Kidd 2004: 68; 
Jessen/Walther 2008: 159f].
As mentioned above the main issue in the redevelopment process was the res-
toration of the economic functions, although security considerations also played 
an important role. Since it was the second attack on Manchester a certain risk 
could be stated [Bevan 2006, 69]. The task was therefore to find a balance be-
tween security measures and the qualities of a shopping based city centre. A 
city centre without a certain “quality” will not attract customers, but nor will a 
centre which is perceived as unsafe [Kitchen 2001, 330]. In order to satisfy the 
personal risk assessment of the customers and to maintain the desired “quality”, 
no physical security measures [like barriers or restricted access as applied in 
London] were prioritised. Instead CCTV- devices were installed. [Kitchen 2001: 
330, 337]
The most important factor in the discussion about the redesign was the “sur-
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vival” of the retailers and the maintenance of the city centre funtionality. This ap-
proach increased due to the fact that suburban shopping areas became more at-
tractive. It was most likely that customers would change their habits, since many 
shops in the centre were closed down. It was clear that the more time that passes 
before the city centre was reconstructed, the more effort it would take to make 
people utilise the area again [Kitchen 
2001: 338]. On the other hand this “op-
portunity” could be seen in the bigger 
context of Urban Regeneration. The 
possibilities which were necessarily 
given by the bombing provided an 
enhancement for an already decayed 
city centre with outdated and non-
functional building structures. [Jes-
sen/Walther 2008: 159f; Williams et al. 
2000: 298]
The mission therefore was to realise a very quick redevelopment process on 
the one hand and to integrate a new and attractive urban design on the other 
hand.  In order to realise both approaches, existing plans were used in order 
to form the development goals. Also an “International Urban Design Competi-
tion” was carried out on 17th June 1996, shortly after the attack. Participation of 
the public was also realised, though only after the five final designs were cho-
sen. Only 19 weeks after the terrorist attack the final design was chosen. Other 
instruments which were used to reach the goals were certain marketing and 
promotion strategies and the step-by-step reopening of the stores (instead of 
a common reopening at the end of the redevelopment process)[Williams et al. 
2000: 300; Kitchen 2001: 333, 337ff; Jessen/Walther 2008: 159f]. The instrument 
which was used to set the redevelopment into practice was a masterplan. The 
objective was to create a “living city ”, which was in line with the city´s Urban 
Regeneration program. The integration of heritage sites was also included into 
this development, not without conflicts and the loss of several sites [Kidd 2004: 
69]. The redevelopment was financed with insurance payments and funds, e.g. 
by the European Union. Characteristics of the new design were public squares 
and green spaces, dense architecture, the integration of public transport and 
representative buildings, and a mixed use of commercial, residential, touristic 
and cultural functions and designs by international architects [fig. 29]. [Jessen/
Walter 159ff; Moss 2011]
The integration of memorial elements into the redevelopment process was ba-
sically limited to a pillarbox, which survived the attack and which was marked 
with a sign, remembering the terrorist attack [Moss 2011]. 
Figure 29:  The new Arndale-Shopping Centre. 
Source:  Chapman Taylor (2012), available at: 
http://www.chapmantaylor.com/en/projects/
detail/manchester-arndale/en/ [Accessed 
10.12.2012]
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It is of significance to note that an explicit change in local or national policies, 
especially with regard to urban planning, cannot be detected. Since it was not 
the first attack on UK soil, a certain anti terrorism policy had already been es-
tablished before the terrorist attack in Manchester, but with no explicit impacts 
on urban planning policies [Coaffee 2004: 202]. The counter terrorism policy 
gained momentum after the attacks on New York´s 9/11 and even more after the 
London Bombings in 2005. The Home Office [2012] states that the biggest threat 
for the United Kingdom is to be seen by international terrorism. The Home Of-
fice is in charge for the counter terrorism strategy, making the United King-
dom to one of the key players in “the Global War on Terror” [Graham 2007]. 
With regard to urban planning and site design, a guideline has been published 
under the responsibility of the Home Office and in cooperation with the Lo-
cal Planning Authorities (cf. [Home Office 2009]). This guideline is dedicated 
to the safeguarding of public spaces and sites against terrorist attacks, focus-
ing on the new development of buildings but also including the adjustment on 
existing sites (“Retro-fitting”)[Home Office 2009:12]. It includes urban design 
principles, physical security measures and the integration of heritage Sites. The 
guideline is in line with the planning legislation of England and can therefore 
be easily applied in planning processes, though it is not mandatory. The main 
focus of the guidelines are security in crowded places and the application of 
risk levels. Main instrument is surveillance via CCTV. [Home Office 2009, Co-
affee 2004] 
5.3 Prelimenary Conclusion
Oklahoma and Manchester have faced terrorism, both under different circum-
stances. Consequently, they have solved the challenge of handling this tragedy 
in different ways.
Oklahoma turned the site into a large memorial, due to the fact that many peo-
ple lost their lives in the attack. Also it was the biggest attack on solid ground 
of the United States since the Second World War and therefore a milestone in 
history. The target was a governmental, political representative building. The at-
tack was also interpreted as an attack on America´s principal values. The most 
important issues for the redesign of the site were memorial and representative 
values. Participation of the population, especially of the victims` families played 
a superior role and was a key element in the design of the site. The destroyed 
building with its governmental functions was re-erected close to its former loca-
tion and with high security standards. 
Manchester, being exposed to terrorist attacks due to the long history of the 
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IRA, used the strategy of redevelopment of the site. This strategy was also cho-
sen due to the fact that the target was not a political symbol, but an economic 
one and its functions as centre of retail were and still are elementary for the city 
of Manchester. Memorial values did not play a superior role due to the fact that 
no fatalities were stated.  There is now only a small sign which can be found, 
erected to remind people of the attack. 
Security issues played an important role in the redesign discussion. The rede-
velopment aimed to create a high quality city centre which was also safe. In 
order to guarantee a certain degree of security, the installation of CCTVs was 
favoured over the installation of other physical security measures e.g. barriers. 
The participatory process was also applied, but only in a very advanced state 
of planning due to the time factor, which played the biggest role in the process. 
Irrespective of the different redesign strategies, both site designs were results 
of international design competitions and both cities established a special task 
force which was in charge of guiding through the process. Whether or not either 
Oklahoma or Manchester consulted other cities with regard to experiences with 
terrorism is not detectable. 
The incidents had different impacts on the particular urban planning policies, 
though the legal framework did not change in Manchester/ in the United King-
dom or Oklahoma / the United States. Manchester´s urban planning policy does 
not seem to have been impacted by the terrorist attack at all. In the aftermaths of 
the terrorist attack on Oklahoma the agency in charge, GSA, developed a guide-
line regarding how to secure governmental buildings, which was mandatory 
for both the new constructions of governmental buildings but also for the retro-
fitting of existing buildings. Also, a new organisation called the ISC was estab-
lished. This organisation deals with safety in governmental owned public build-
ings. The design criteria were updated regularly and essentially influenced the 
urban design of public sites in the United Stated. The stand-off of buildings, the 
usage of barriers and the design of parking lots are just a few results.
With regard to both cases the following facts can be stated: 
The redesign strategy seems to be dependent on the target of the attack and its 
dimension (number of fatalities), expressed by the memorial values. The me-
morial values in Oklahoma were overwhelming due to the politically symbolic 
nature of the building and the number of victims, turning the site into a tragedy 
site for the whole nation. Also the functions of the target and their meaning for 
the organisation of a city are essential for the length of the redesign process. 
The governmental functions of the destroyed building in Oklahoma could be 
replaced easily. This is in stark contrast to the retail centre of a city and the 
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shopping habits of the population, which are more difficult to relocate and are 
connected with long term impacts. 
Effective instruments in the redesign process seem to be the establishment of a 
special dedicated task force and the realization of an international design com-
petition. The redesign of the attacked site and the impacts on urban planning are 
strictly to be seen in context with the historic background, the experiences with 
terrorism and the resulting self image. Whereas the United States felt “person-
ally attacked” with the domestic terrorist attack, the United Kingdom seemed to 
be more resistant due to their long history with the domestic IRA-terrorism. This 
changed essentially after the 7/7 incident. Both the United Kingdom and the 
United States are “key player in the Global War on Terrorism” [Graham 2007]. 
This affects both the foreign policy and the internal policy. However it should 
be mentioned, that a certain critical reflection of the backgrounds and reasons 
of the terrorist attacks remained undone [Marcuse 2007, Bevin 2006, Doss 2010, 
Graham 2007]. 
This socio-political attitude is reflected in matters of urban planning as usual. 
It does not necessarily lead to a changed legal framework, but obviously to a 
changed urban design of public spaces and buildings. Security measures be-
ing, architectural, physical, technical or all three, are implemented generously 
in the United Stated and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the attacks. This 
does not seem to impact the behavior of the population, which did not change 
e.g. after the Oklahoma City Bombing – and obviously also not after 9/11 [...; 
Marcuse, Eisenberger]. The question remains, if this is due to, or in spite of the 
implemented security measures.
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6 Comparison, Combination, 
Consolidation
This chapter aims to consolidate the different results which were gained through 
the case studies with focus on the research questions. A comparison per se is 
not purposive due to the different frameworks, backgrounds, circumstances 
and, moreover, individual effects of every terrorist attack. Instead this chapter 
should aim to give an understanding how reactions to terrorist attacks can look 
like and if there are lessons to be learned. Is there a common output? Where are 
differences and why? Which factors do play a role for the determined results? 
•	 How is the future of the impacted site discussed and which kind of futures 
can be identified?
Both the final replacement of functions and the reconstruction can be a solution 
Figure 30: CCTV at the Y-Blokka in Oslo. Soruce: Own Photo, 12.11.2012
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for those sites [Bevan 2006: 176]. The discussion on the future of the attacked 
site depends on the former use. Manchester´s attacked city centre needed a 
fast redevelopment solution because the loss of this site had deep financial im-
pacts in the first place. The economic factors of this site were most relevant and 
guiding for the redevelopment process. A replacement of these functions with 
other functions was not at all considered due to the relevance of the centre in 
the city. The final redevelopment was not only the reconstruction of the former 
functions, but also the enhancement of this area due to new and functional ur-
ban design and architecture. The sites in Oslo and Oklahoma City were govern-
mental areas, with political and symbolic values. The interim relocation of the 
particular functions did and does not have such long term impacts as e.g. the 
replacement of a shopping area. The reasons are to be seen in the frequency 
of the usage of the area by every single person (irregularly vs. daily/weekly). 
Both Oklahoma City and Oslo had and have more time to derivate an appropri-
ate design solution for the future. Due to the socio-political framework and the 
American self-image Oklahoma City decided to establish a memorial instead 
and relocated the former governmental functions. Oslo in contrast will go back 
to the former use as a governmental quarter, also with the integration of a me-
morial and – most likely - the consideration of the cultural heritage values of the 
buildings.  In consequence the redesign processes require different durations. 
Participation is therefore considered to different amounts. Manchester carried 
out a very fast process, where the final design solution was found already 19 
weeks after the attack. Participation was reduced to a minimum and only car-
ried out for the five final design ideas. The design of the memorial took more 
time and was inaugurated five years after the attack. Participation, especially of 
the victims / their families was part of the process from on beginning. Participa-
tion also plays a big role in the process in Oslo, not only fueled by the discussion 
which took place in the media, but also initiated by the municipalities (question-
naires, blogs, and consultations). Instruments which seem to be popular for the 
redesign of attacked sites are the establishment of special task forces, which 
coordinate the process, and the execution of international design competitions. 
Those instruments were used both in Manchester and Oklahoma City and the 
execution of an international design competition is sought in Oslo; too. Even 
though the redevelopment strategies and durations differ among those three 
case studies, a certain similarity in the used instruments and can be seen. 
•	 How have the factors cultural heritage / memorial values and security 
been discussed after the terrorist act, especially at the impacted site? Is 
there a change in the considerations of those aspects in general and if 
yes, is this a shock-reaction or will it be a long-term-impact? 
A change in the consideration of the factor cultural heritage cannot be detected 
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for Manchester or Oklahoma, neither site related nor city wide. It though is a 
factor in the discussion about the Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo, but only because 
it has been a point of discussion before and plans to conserve some of the build-
ings had been on the way. A change of the city wide consideration is not detect-
able as well.
Due to the few victims of the Manchester bombing memorial values did not 
play a significant role in the aftermath of the attack. In contrast memorial val-
ues played the most important role in the discussion about the redesign of the 
terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. The final design of the site, a memorial, ex-
pressed the importance, though there is a discrepancy between the individual, 
“personal” moaning in the direct aftermath of the attack and the public, insti-
tutionalised moaning in context with the memorial. Memorials in the US, either 
for attacks on their own solid ground or for the mark of happenings overseas, 
are an instrument to express the American self image, proclaim their values or 
to promote their anti-terrorism policy. The Oklahoma City National Memorial is 
therefore to be seen in the context of the tradition of “memorial mania” in the 
United States [Doss 2010: 117, Bevan 2006: 199]. Memorial values played a role 
in the discussion about the redesign of the attacked site in Oslo as well, espe-
cially when it came to the location of the memorial. The decision now fell and 
the memorial will be located in the new Regjeringskvartalet, integrated into the 
new governmental quarter. This area is a realm of memory because it was the 
target of the attack. There is also an even though small discrepancy between the 
individual, “personal” moaning in the direct aftermath (which happened at the 
Domkirka and Youngstorget) and the now institutionalised public moaning.
Since a terrorist attack is a matter of security, the discussion has to take place 
in the aftermath of attacks one way or another. In the discussion about the rede-
velopment of Manchester´s city centre different security measures were con-
sidered and several CCTVs were installed to balance the need for security and 
the quality and attraction of the city’s most important shopping area. Security 
measures played a role in the discussion of the new design of the attacked site 
in Oslo as well, especially because the area will host governmental functions 
again. They will be an important criterion in the new development but no fi-
nal decision about the extent of the measures is made so far. The most input 
will probably be given by the security experts, NSM, PST, and Statsbygg. In the 
design process of the memorial in Oklahoma City security measures did not 
play a significant role, at least not with regard to urban design. This is probably 
because the memorial did not contain any new buildings. However the security 
discussion was moved onto a higher, national level. Results of that discussion 
were applied in the new Oklahoma City Federal Building, which was erected 
close to the site. 
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Since conservation values or memorial values just have been discussed with 
regard to the impacted site security became a national matter of interest. With-
out going deep into the discussions about the particular security politics it 
can be stated that especially the United States and the United Kingdom have 
passed several laws after experiencing terrorist attacks, which are promoting 
antiterrorism or counterterrorism. Especially after the 9/11- and 7/7-attacks the 
“global war on terror” [Graham 2007] was proclaimed. Those attacks did not 
influence the urban planning policy (such as building codes) but the national 
security policies. The interface between the national security policy and urban 
planning is not always easy to identify. First of all, the analysis of Oklahoma City 
/ United States and Manchester / United Kingdom shows, that one consequence 
of terrorist attacks is the development of guidelines for security measures and 
in urban design. These aim to create a more defensive and resistant architecture 
and urban design. The guideline which was developed in the aftermath of the 
Oklahoma City Bombing was mandatory for all governmental owned buildings 
in the United States. Also a special organisation, the ISC, which combines secu-
rity and urban planning matters, has been established. Other guidelines, like 
those from FEMA or the Home Office, are not mandatory and can be applied 
on public or private owned buildings. The guidelines also consists a risk and 
threat assessment in order to derive a classification for different security needs 
of buildings. Those guidelines are not published by the urban planning authori-
ties but by the security authorities (GSA, FEMA, Home Office, NSM). They are 
based on the legal framework for security regulations in the particular coun-
tries and in cooperation with researchers or the municipalities. The national 
socio-political tenor is reflected in those guidelines. Especially the mandatory 
guideline of the GSA for all governmental owned buildings in the US affected 
the appearance and urban design of US cities. An outstanding example for the 
connection of security and urban design is the National Capital Security Design 
Plan in Washington. 
Besides that the security usually is site related, like in Manchester (CCTVs). 
There are no indicators for overall security plans or integrated security mea-
sures in urban development plans. On governmental owned buildings, like the 
new Oklahoma City Federal building, or the financial and governmental district 
in London or Washington the security measures are increased in general due 
to the functions of the area and due to the bigger influence of the national se-
curity organisations on those public buildings (Home Office, GSA). Oslo does 
show tendencies towards this trend as well, but at this moment it is not clear if 
this can be traced back to a change in the urban design mentality towards se-
curity or the still ongoing construction work. Also an interface between security 
requirements and urban planning can be realised in the planning process. As 
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enforced laws security acts have to be considered in the development of urban 
development plans and so forth. Security measures in urban planning, which 
can be applied by building codes, are distances and the stand-off of buildings, 
the location of parking lots (or location of functions in general), restriction of 
access to streets or mandatory building materials. This was set into practice in 
the masterplan in Manchester and was planned for Grubbegata in Oslo. Usually 
the professional input of experts is required (GSA or ISC in the US; Home Office 
in UK, NSM/PST in Norway). The consultation of security experts in the formal 
planning process is therefore one possibility to ensure a certain security level, 
but if not initiated by the developers this step comes quite late and at a point, 
where the design is usually fixed.
The aspects security, memorial values and conservation values have been dis-
cussed differently in all three cases, dependent on the particular circumstances 
and the national socio-political background and national self-image. A change 
of the considerations of those aspects after terrorist attacks in the general course 
of urban planning cannot be stated per se. However the appearance of cities 
nowadays in western societies, characterised by a certain amount of hardened 
architecture shows [Savitch 2008:134ff; Marcuse 2007; Silverberg/Rogers 2011], 
that security measures to different amounts have been implemented in the ur-
ban design, especially on public and governmental owned sites. 
•	 Does an act of terror affect only the impacted site or does it impact the 
whole urban planning policy? If there is a change in the urban planning 
policy – how can this be detected and characterised? How does the 
(new) urban planning policy respond to the socio-political approaches 
of the national policy and after-terrorism-reaction?
Without question the biggest impacts are visible on the site of the terrorist at-
tack; not only when speaking of the damages but also when it comes to discus-
sions about the aftermaths and the redevelopment of the site. In order to verify a 
change in the urban planning policy as well, certain aspects, which characterise 
the urban planning, are taken into consideration. Those are, among others, the 
legal framework, the overall concepts, the significance of participation and con-
sultation, the planning process and the role of the urban planners – both before 
and after the terrorist attack. The case studies show results, which will help to 
show tendencies of changes, if existent.
A change in the legal framework cannot be detected in the cases of Oklahoma/
US, Manchester/UK and Oslo/Norway. The national building codes usually al-
ready included objectives like “security” or “safe communities” but terrorism is 
not especially mentioned. That does not imply that the prevention of terrorism 
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is not an objective of urban planning, but aspects like crime protection, social 
security, environmental security, fire safeguarding and so on are more evident. 
This seems reasonable since the risk of terrorist attacks in the Western World 
is quite low in contrast to those basic life quality approaches. Consequently a 
change in the planning process with regard to its formal structure did not take 
place as well. Moreover with regard to the research design of the paper there 
are no indications that the other named factors are impacted as well. The analy-
sis of Oklahoma City and Manchester did not allow such a deep insight but the 
case of Oslo showed no tendencies in a changed urban planning policy. Both 
municipalities and experts on urban planning did not detect such a change, 
neither a reconsideration of ongoing projects nor a changed overall concept for 
future projects. In the times of neo-liberal influence the role of urban planners in 
the municipalities in England or Norway is not essentially based on the design 
of e.g. site related zoning plans but on overall municipal urban development 
plans. Urban planners usually have a consultant role by guiding the private in-
vestors or stakeholders through the formal planning process. The carrying out 
of international design competitions, especially after the attacks, promotes this 
statement even more. 
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7 Results and Outlook
After the analysis of the particular cases and the compilation of them, the last 
chapter of this paper aims to point out general results about the impacts of ter-
rorism on urban planning. Due to the results of the paper the hypotheses, which 
were raised at the beginning, have to be revised under consideration of the 
given limitations and the restrictions of objectivity, validity and reliability. More-
over an outlook on the topic, also with regard to remaining questions will be 
given.
 ! Sites of terrorist attacks are passing through a different renewal planning 
process other than “usual sites” due to their sensible destiny. 
This hypothesis can be generally validated. On the one hand, the site related 
renewal process is in line with Ibsen`s “Når utgangspunktet er galest blir tidt re-
sultatet originalest” – special circumstances accomplish special measurements. 
On the other hand even if similarities can be seen in the renewal planning pro-
cesses, each process is individual and hardly comparable, due to different rede-
velopment goals, general circumstances and the national self-image. However 
Figure 31: Street Art in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 27.03.2012
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the planning process of the sites of terrorist attacks differs from the planning 
process of “usual” sites in all three cases speaking of the duration, the used in-
struments and the participation of stakeholders.
 ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects se-
curity, and memorial and Conservation values are undergoing a long-term 
change in general consideration. 
This hypothesis cannot be explicit validated. As explained above memorial/
conservation values are not necessarily the most significant aspects in the rede-
sign discussion. Economic aspects, the reuse strategy and the redevelopment 
process itself do also play an important role. The discussion about memorial 
values depends on the number of victims, the meaning of the attack in a bigger 
context and the functions and significance of memorials in the particular coun-
try. The instrumentalisation of memorials for profiling or self-manifestation and 
the resulting discrepancy between personal affected and public moaning in the 
United States is not comparable to memorials in the United Kingdom or Norway 
[Doss 2010]. 
Conservation values are only discussed when (soon to be) listed buildings or 
cultural heritage has been the target of the attack. Moreover a change in the 
general considerations of those aspects in matters of urban planning cannot be 
detected at all. 
However security is a main issue in the aftermath discussion of the attack, not 
necessarily with regard to the redesign of sites of terrorist attacks but on a gen-
eral political level. The appearance of today`s cities in the western society show 
increased hardened architecture and security measures, which could mean that 
security aspects increased in weight in the urban design. 
Consequently the hypothesis should rather say: Due to their significance in the 
redesign of terrorist sites  security aspects are undergoing a long-term change 
in general consideration. 
 ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks in dependency of 
the national socio-political respond on the attacks.
This hypothesis cannot be validated. The analysis of the cases showed that no 
change in the legal planning framework and in consequence in the general ur-
ban planning policy can be detected, neither in theory nor in practice. Due to 
the reasons explained above the hypothesis should rather be drafted as: Even 
though the national (security) policy can alter after terrorist attacks, the urban 
planning policy does not undergo a significant change.
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The paper shows that speaking for the three case studies no significant changes 
in urban planning policies can be detected. The legal framework seems to re-
main the same and so does the general structure of the planning process and 
the used instruments.
The impacted sites instead experience a special and different planning process 
due to their sensitive destiny as tragedy sites. The site design and the impor-
tance of certain values, like security or memorialisation, differs in dependency 
on the target and its functions, the victims, the economic situation and signifi-
cance of the building and – moreover – the national self image and self aware-
ness. Terrorism, as a targeted instrument used in order to gain certain, in these 
cases political goals impacts the site in the first place. Consequently security 
is discussed after the attacks in particular, but not only with regard to the site. 
In the US the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law was passed after 
the attack on the Oklahoma City Building. The security policy also impacts the 
appearance of cities, that is to say their urban design, nowadays. The security 
agencies in the United States and in the United Kingdom published guidelines 
in order to bungle both security and urban design, in line with their “global 
war on terror” [Graham 2007]. This resulted in hardened architecture, restricted 
public space and surveillance – a not always appropriate shrinkage of urban 
space [Savitch 2008: 136, 168f]. If Oslo will follow this trend is hard to say at this 
moment; at least the experts do not anticipate such a tendency. The political 
guidance in Norway also does not seem to choose this way, not only because 
their socio-political respond to the terrorist attack is “more openness, more de-
mocracy”. But measures which go beyond the limits of the actual security - and 
Planning and Building Act are not planned or applied yet. Also it is quite obvi-
ous that public or governmental used buildings are equipped with higher se-
curity standards than other, maybe public used buildings. This is because the 
influence on security authorities on “their” properties is higher than on build-
ings or areas, which are developed by private investors and private stakehold-
ers. Therefore it is questionable, in how far guidelines, like those published by 
FEMA and Home Office are applied in reality. This question cannot be answered 
here, as this requires further qualitative research. 
Moreover those security measures should aim to create a “resilient” city, a city 
which can continue its normal daily life after terrorist attacks as soon as pos-
sible. The fact that the urban planning policy did not change after the attacks in 
the United States, United Kingdom and Norway can state, that these cities or at 
least their planning policies are resilient in a way. 
“Resilience might also be achieved if an attack had not changed funda-
mental conditions or had no significant effects on normal life.  This would 
74 Urban Planning After Terrorism
mean a city had seen no adverse change and withstood an intended shock. 
A city meeting these criteria could be seen as resilient.” [Savitch 2008: 153] 
The same can be stated for the population and their behaviour in the city. Short-
ly after the particular attack the citizens of Manchester, Oklahoma City and New 
York fell back to their usual daily routine, obviously not been intimidated by a 
certain terrorist risk [Eisinger 2004: 127; Marcuse 2007]. This could be an ex-
pression for a resilient population and as a consequence of their personal risk 
assessment. Since not every attack can be avoided, it is more important how a 
city and its population deals with the consequences in the aftermath. On the 
other hand it is not quite clear if this personal risk assessment origins from or in 
spite of the increased security measures. 
All three cases show that terrorist attacks, their impacts and the procession do 
have a very individual effects. Terrorism is in general a reaction on the policy of 
the targeted country. The reasons for terrorist attacks are not to be found in the 
urban planning policy of a country – urban planning therefore is not in charge 
for combating terrorism, that is to say prevent or ward off terrorist attacks. How-
ever urban planning should create “safe” communities. Urban planning can 
contribute to create safer environments and minimise the consequences of ter-
rorist attacks on citizens, the building structure and the functioning of a city, 
although other approaches are more likely and more prior, like crime preven-
tion, environmental health and general safeguarding. This can be realised in 
the building codes through different perimeters, access, mandatory materials 
or other requirements. The balance between those security measures and the 
qualities of “freedom” and “urbanity” depends on the national politic attitude , 
the grown self-image and the very history of terrorism. Differences between the 
appearance of cities in the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, but 
also between the cities within a country are therefore reasonable. New York or 
London had to face a higher number of terrorist incidents than the investigat-
ed cases. This affected the appereance of the cities, based on local decisions, 
but also on basis of national guidelines. London for example implemented the 
“Ring of Steel”, a 10km long barrier, which secured private and public spaces 
as well as entrances of economic and political buildings via 1500 CCTVs. In ad-
dition roads were closed or transformed into one-way-streets. London turned 
“into the most surveilled space in the UK and perhaps the world”[Graham 2007; 
Coaffee 2004:205]. 
One question which could not be answered in this paper is if the reuse strategy 
of tragedy sites, which is applied after the terrorist attack, can be an expression 
of how to deal with the attack and the aftermaths as Bevan [2006: 198] argued 
that “rebuilding may be an act of resistance to some; but to others disturbing a 
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site where such a massive loss of life has occurred is a sacrilege”. The line be-
tween resilience that is to say rebuilding a realm of memory and still keeping 
the possibility of moaning is quite thin. The future of the Regjeringskvartalet will 
show, if and how this balance will be found.
Another unanswered question is the interface between security and urban plan-
ning or urban design. As to be stated by experts a hardened architecture can be 
found in nowadays cities. Though it is not quite clear who actually promotes this 
trend, who is behind these decisions and how huge the role of urban planners 
in this process is. 
Risk and threat assessments are implemented in both the GSA- and FEMA- and 
Home Office guidelines and in both the Planning and Building Act and Security 
Act in Norway. The risk and threat assessment is an useful instrument to analyse 
and identify the actual risk an area is exposed to. This helps to apply useful and 
appropriate security measures. Unclear to this point is in how far this instrument 
is applied in reality, who applied it and who controls or double-checks the re-
sults of the assessment: In short, how this instrument is set into practice. 
The same can be questioned for the participation and consultation of security 
experts in the planning process. How much are they involved in urban develop-
ment projects or site-related plans and projects? Who controls if their input is 
necessary or not?
Despite these unanswered questions the paper could give a certain contribu-
tion to the topic of urban planning and terrorism. The comprehensive analysis 
of Oslo gives a summary about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet with regard 
to the consideration of factors such as security, cultural heritage, memorial val-
ues, economic aspects and the planning process design. Although an explicit 
result of Oslo´s future is not quite clear yet and possible further impacts on ur-
ban planning in Oslo are not evident at this time certain tendencies could be 
identified with the help of the experts. Also the combined reflection of three, 
under certain points of view similar conditioned cases shows different ways of 
dealing with a traumatic shock. This states that terrorist attacks do have a very 
individual effects and despite measures for prevention it will always remain a 
unique and incisive event where individual redevelopment prove the abnormal-
ity of those attacks, even though they increased in number in the last years. The 
consequence is a trend to hardened architecture in architecture and changes 
in urban design with impacts on public urban space and the appearances of 
cities nowadays though the general urban planning policy does not seem to be 
affected by the attacks.
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malpfl egerischen Umgangs mit Freifl ächen der 2. Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts.
2011, 134 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2340-7  14,90 €
Diskussionsbeiträge
Das vollständige Programm fi nden sie unter www.isr.tu-berlin.de
Nr. 58
Guido Spars (Hrsg.)
Wohnungsmarktentwicklung Deutschland
Trends, Segmente, Instrumente
Die Wohnungsmarktentwicklung in Deutschland ist zunehmend von Ausdifferenzierungsprozessen auf der 
Nachfrage- und der Angebotsseite geprägt. Die Teilmärkte entwickeln sich höchst unterschiedlich. Die Parallelität 
von Schrumpfung und Wachstum einzelner Segmente z.B. aufgrund  regionaler Bevölkerungsgewinne und 
-verluste,  der Überalterung der Gesellschaft,  der Vereinzelung und Heterogenisierung von Nachfragern, 
 des wachsenden Interesses internationaler Kapitalanleger stellen neue Anforderungen an die Stadt- und 
Wohnungspolitik, an die Wohnungsunternehmen und Investoren und ebenso an die wissenschaftliche Begleitung 
dieser Prozesse.
Mit Beiträgen von Thomas Hafner, Nancy Häusel, Tobias Just, Frank Jost, Anke Bergner, Christian 
Strauß, u.a.
2006, 313 S., ISBN 3 7983 2016 0    9,90 €
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Ulrike Lange/Florian Hutterer
Hafen und Stadt im Austausch
Ein strategisches Entwicklungskonzept für eine Hafenbereich in Hamburg
In den zentral gelegenen Hafenbereichen von Hamburg hat in den letzten Jahren ein Umwandlungsprozess 
eingesetzt, der noch immer andauert. Allgemein zurückgehende Investitionstätigkeit und die unsichere wirt-
schaftliche Entwicklung, sowie räumliche Besonderheiten des Ortes lassen Zweifel aufkommen, ob die viel 
praktizierte Masterplanung für eine Entwicklung der Hafenbereiche am südlichen Elbufer geeignet ist. Die vorlie-
gende Arbeit schlägt daher eine Strategie der Nadelstiche vor. Für die Umstrukturierung dieses Hafenbereichs 
soll eine Herangehensweise angewendet werden, die sich die sukzessiven Wachstumsprozesse einer Stadt zu 
eigen macht. Durch Projekte als Initialzündungen und ausgewählte räumliche Vorgaben soll unter Einbeziehung 
wichtiger Akteure ein Prozess in Gang gebracht und geleitet werden, der fl exibel auf wirtschaftliche, soziale und 
räumlich-strukturelle Veränderungen reagieren kann.
2006, 129 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2016-1   9,90 €
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Anja Besecke, Robert Hänsch, Michael Pinetzki (Hrsg.)
Das Flächensparbuch
Diskussion zu Flächenverbrauch und lokalem Bodenbewusstsein
Brauchen wir ein „Flächensparbuch“, wenn in Deutschland die Wirtschafts- und Bevölkerungsentwicklung 
stagniert oder sogar rückläufi g ist? Ja, denn trotz Stagnation der Wirtschafts- und Bevölkerungsentwicklung 
wächst die Inanspruchnahme von Flächen für Siedlungs- und Verkehrszwecke. Dies läuft dem Ziel zu einem 
schonenden und sparsamen Umgang mit der Ressource Boden und damit dem Leitbild einer nachhaltigen 
Siedlungsentwicklung entgegen. Das Gut „Fläche“ ist vielseitigen Nutzungsansprüchen ausgesetzt und dessen 
Inanspruchnahme ist aufgrund divergierender Interessen häufi g ein Streitthema. Dieser Sammelband soll die 
aktuelle Diskussion aufzeigen, die auf dem Weg zu einer Reduktion der Flächenneu inanspruchnahme von den 
verschiedenen Akteuren geprägt wird. Dabei reicht der Blick von der Bundespolitik bis zur kommunalen Ebene 
und von der wissenschaftlichen Theorie bis zur planerischen Praxis. 
2005, 207 S., ISBN 3 7983 1994 4   9,90 €
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung
Technische Universität Berlin
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Isabella Haidle, Christoph Arndt
Urbane Gärten in Buenos Aires 
Im Zuge der Modernisierung und Industrialisierung im letzten Jahrhundert geriet die Praxis des innerstädtischen 
Gemüseanbaus jedoch weitgehend aus dem Blickfeld der Stadtplanung. In der Realität verschwand sie nie-
mals ganz, sondern bestand informell weiter. Erst die Krisen der Moderne bzw. das Ende des fordistischen 
Entwicklungsmodells haben weltweit zu einer intensiveren theoretischen Beschäftigung mit kleinteiligen, vor 
Ort organisierten, informellen Praxen geführt. Die Interaktion der GärtnerInnen mit der Stadtentwicklung und 
Stadtplanung rückt seit einigen Jahren ins Zentrum des Interesses. Die AutorInnen versuchen zwischen der 
Planung und den Ideen der GärtnerInnen zu vermitteln, indem sie mögliche Potenziale und Defi zite der einzelnen 
Projekte aufzeigen und Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten formulieren.
2007, 204 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2053-6    9,90 €
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Ursula Flecken, Florian Hutterer (Hrsg.)
Public Space in Outer Warsaw: 
Ideas for the large housing estate Ursynów
Urban Design Workshop 2011
Zwischen dem ISR und der Politechnika Warschau besteht seit 20 Jahren eine Kooperation. Deren Schwerpunkt 
ist ein jährlicher Entwurfsworkshop, in dem polnische und deutsche Studierende zusammenarbeiten. 2011 
widmete sich der Workshop dem öffentlichen Raum in einer Warschauer Plattenbausiedlung. Dieses Heft zeigt 
die Ergebnisse daraus. Gemeinsam ist ihnen eine intensive Beschäftigung mit Qualitäten des Freiraums, mit 
der Aktivierung der Bewohner und mit sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen. Mit diesem Fokus leisten die 
Entwürfe einen Beitrag zur Debatte, wie Großsiedlungen weiter qualifi ziert werden sollen.
2012, 65 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2437-4 kostenloser download unter www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe
Nr. 46
Michael Färber
Energetische und Soziale Problemlagen in Berlin
Eine GIS-gestützte Untersuchung von energieefﬁ zienter Wohngebäudesanierung 
im Hinblick auf sozioökonomisch schwache Gebiete
Die Arbeit „Energetische und Soziale Problemlagen in Berlin - Eine GISgestützte Untersuchung von 
energieeffi zienter Wohngebäudesanierung im Hinblick auf sozioökonomisch schwache Gebiete“ untersucht 
vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender Relevanz von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen die Zusammenhänge von 
Gebäudebeständen, Sanierungskosten und sozialräumlichen Daten auf räumlicher Ebene am Beispiel Berlin. 
Dabei werden energetische Problemlagen und soziale Problemlagen identifi ziert, miteinander verschränkt und 
darüber eine soziale Dimension der energetischen Stadterneuerung erschlossen.
2013, 177 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2434-3 kostenloser download unter www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe
Nr. 48
Henry Wilke
Raum ist Zeit
Zeitentfernungskarten als Orientierungssystem im städtischen Fußverkehr
Zeitentfernungskarten bilden das Verhältnis von räumlicher und zeitlicher Distanz ab. Am Beispiel von 
Webanwendungen und Orientierungssystemen europäischer Städte werden Isochronenkarten im Fußverkehr 
untersucht. Fokussiert wird dabei der Unterschied zwischen abstrakten Darstellungen, deren Distanzen lediglich 
Luftlinien entsprechen und realitätsnahen Abbildungen, die alle räumlichen und topografi schen Parameter 
berücksichtigen. Eine nicht repräsentative Umfrage kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Nutzer eine einfache und klar 
verständliche Karte höher bewerten als eine detailreiche und realistische Darstellung.
2013, 83 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2439-8 kostenloser download unter www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe
Nr. 49
Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper & Annemarie Rothe
Die Kirchenburgenlandschaft Siebenbürgens
Strategien zur Erhaltung des europäischen Kulturerbes der Kirchenburgen 
in Siebenbürgen/Rumänien
Die einzigartige europäische Kulturlandschaft der siebenbürgischen Kirchenburgen ist durch die Veränderungen 
seit 1989 in großer Gefahr. Dem über 800 Jahre gepfl egten Kulturerbe der Siebenbürger Sachsen droht durch 
Abwanderung und den demografi schen Wandel der Verfall. Neue Ansätze und Strategien zum Erhalt der Kirchen, 
Wehranlagen und Nebengebäude sind dringend erforderlich. In dem Strategiekonzept werden die Situation 
der Baudenkmäler und der sie umgebenden Dörfer analysiert und Anregungen für den zukünftigen Umgang 
aufgezeigt.
.
2013, 111 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2618-7 kostenloser download unter www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe
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2009
Megacities und Stadterneuerung
Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2009 widmet sich dem Schwerpunkt Stadterneuerung und Stadtumbau in den 
rasch wachsenden Metropolen des Südens. Die wachsende Wohnungsnot, Elendsviertelentwicklung, Verkehrs-
chaos, Umweltprobleme und Klimaschutz erfordern ein Umdenken und machen prekäre globale Abhängigkeiten 
auch für die „Erste Welt“ deutlich. 
Die Beiträge in diesem Band beziehen sich neben theoretischen und historischen Aspekten der Stadterneue-
rung vor allem auf Einordnungen, Fallstudien und Handlungsansätze von Mega-Städten vor dem Hintergrund 
sehr unterschiedlicher Problemlagen und Akteurskonstellationen. Bisherige Muster und „bewährte“ Konzepte 
der Stadterneuerung und des Stadtumbaus werden durch die epochale Krise in Frage gestellt, und es gilt stärker 
denn je nach innovativen Konzepten der Bestandsentwicklungspolitik zu suchen, mit denen auf die weltweiten 
komplexen Herausforderungen reagiert werden kann. „Yes, we can?“
2009, 343 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2134-2 18,90 €
MEGACITIES UND 
STADTERNEUERUNG
Arbeitskreis Stadterneuerung an deutschsprachigen Hochschulen
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung der Technischen Universität Berlin
Herausgeber: 
Uwe Altrock, Ronald Kunze, Elke Pahl-Weber, Ursula von Petz, Dirk Schubert
Jahrbuch STADTERNEUERUNG
2009
  
2010
Infrastrukturen und Stadtumbau
Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2010 beinhaltet in diesem Jahr den Schwerpunkt „Soziale und technische In-
frastruktur im Wandel“. Die Rahmenbedingungen, der Stellenwert und der Zusammenhang von Infrastruktur 
und Stadterneuerung haben sich in den letzten Jahren gravierend verändert. Schrumpfende Städte, Rückbau, 
kommunale Haushaltsprobleme und der Niedergang sowie die Schließung von Einrichtungen, die in früheren 
Stadterneuerungsphasen mit öffentlichen Mittel gefördert wurden, machen eine Neubewertung und eine dif-
ferenzierte Bestandsaufnahme erforderlich, um neue Herausforderungen zu refl  ektieren. Vor dem Hintergrund 
des demographischen Wandels sind „bewährte“ Strukturen für Bemessung, Bau, Betrieb und Nutzung von In-
frastrukturen im Kontext des Stadtumbaus in Frage gestellt. Neben diesem Schwerpunktthema werden Lehre 
und Forschung, theoretische und historische Aspekte der Stadterneuerung sowie auch neue Praxen im In- und 
Ausland in den Beiträgen thematisiert.
2010, 376 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2230-1 20,90 €
INFRASTRUKTUREN
UND STADTUMBAU
Arbeitskreis Stadterneuerung an deutschsprachigen Hochschulen
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung der Technischen Universität Berlin
Herausgeber: Uwe Altrock, Ronald Kunze, Ursula von Petz, Dirk Schubert
Jahrbuch STADTERNEUERUNG
2010
  
2011
Stadterneuerung und Festivalisierung
Seit zwei Jahrzehnten wird das Thema der Festivalisierung der Stadtplanung und der Stadterneuerung kontrovers 
diskutiert. Kleine und große Festivals und diverse Veranstaltungen unterschiedlichen Formats sind weiter en 
vogue, und derartige Events werden gezielt als strategisches Instrument der Stadtpolitik eingesetzt. Auch in 
den letzten Jahren spielen sie als Internationale Bauausstellungen, Gartenschauen und ähnliche Ereignisse für 
Stadtumbau und Stadterneuerung eine besondere Rolle. Anlass genug, dieses Thema – inzwischen durchgängig 
Gegenstand von Stadtforschung und Planungstheorie – in diesem Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung schwerpunktmäßig 
aufzunehmen und in den einzelnen Beiträgen aus verschiedenen Perspektiven kritisch zu refl  ektieren. Daneben 
werden auch in diesem Jahrbuch neben dem Schwerpunktthema Lehre und Forschung theoretische und histo-
rische Aspekte der Stadterneuerung sowie auch Praxen im In- und Ausland in den Beiträgen thematisiert.
2011, 378 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2339-1 20,90 €
STADTERNEUERUNG
UND FESTIVALISIERUNG
Arbeitskreis Stadterneuerung an deutschsprachigen Hochschulen
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung der Technischen Universität Berlin
Herausgeber: Uwe Altrock, Ronald Kunze, Gisela Schmitt, Dirk Schubert
Jahrbuch STADTERNEUERUNG
2011
2012
40 Jahre Städtebauförderung – 50 Jahre Nachmoderne
Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2012 ist das 20. Jahrbuch, nachdem kurz nach der Wende 1990/91 die erste 
Ausgabe erschienen war. Zentraler Anlass für die aktuell geleistete Refl  exion über Errungenschaften, Stand-
ortbestimmung und Perspektiven der Stadterneuerung war das 40jährige Jubiläum des Städtebauförderungs-
gesetzes, das bis heute als Besonderes Städtebaurecht in weiterentwickelter Form den rechtlichen Rahmen 
der Bund-Länder-Städtebauförderung und damit die Stadterneuerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland maß-
geblich bestimmt. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Herausbildung der noch immer gültigen Grundprinzipien einer 
Bestandspolitik, die Zug um Zug auf weitere Quartierstypen und stadtentwicklungspolitische Herausforderungen 
angepasst und übertragen wurden. Dabei geht es sowohl um die beziehungsreiche Nachzeichnung und Einord-
nung des historischen Wandels in der Planungs- und insbesondere Stadterneuerungskultur als auch um die Refl  
exion der Wirkungsmächtigkeit nachmoderner Prinzipien in der Bestandsentwicklung.
2012, 369 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2420-6 20,90 €
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Portrait des Instituts für Stadt- und Regionalplanung
Menschen beanspruchen in sehr unterschiedlicher Art und Weise ihren Lebensraum. Die damit verbun-
denen Auseinandersetzungen um verschiedene Nutzungsansprüche an den Boden, die Natur, Gebäude, 
Anlagen oder Finanzmittel schaffen Anlass und Arbeitsfelder für die Stadt- und Regionalplanung. Das 
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung (ISR) an der Technischen Universität Berlin ist mit Forschung und 
Lehre in diesem Spannungsfeld tätig.
Institut
Das 1974 gegründete Institut setzt sich heute aus sieben Fachgebieten zusammen: Bestandsentwick-
lung und Erneuerung von Siedlungseinheiten, Bau- und Planungsrecht, Denkmalpfl ege, Orts-, Regional- 
und Landesplanung, Planungstheorie, Städtebau- und Siedlungswesen sowie Stadt- und Regionalöko-
nomie. Gemeinsam mit weiteren Fachgebieten der Fakultät VI Planen Bauen Umwelt verantwortet das 
Institut die Studiengänge Stadt- und Regionalplanung, Urban Design, Real Estate Management und 
Urban Management.
Mit dem Informations- und Projektzentrum hat das ISR eine zentrale Koordinierungseinrichtung, in der 
die Publikationsstelle und eine kleine Bibliothek, u.a. mit studentischen Abschlussarbeiten angesiedelt 
sind. Der Kartographieverbund im Institut pfl egt einen großen Bestand an digitalen und analogen Karten, 
die der gesamten Fakultät zur Verfügung stehen.
Studium
Stadt- und Regionalplanung an der Technischen Universität Berlin ist ein interdisziplinärer und prozess-
orientierter Bachelor- und Masterstudiengang. Die Studierenden lernen, bezogen auf Planungsräume 
unterschiedlicher Größe (vom Einzelgrundstück bis zu länderübergreifenden Geltungsbereichen), plane-
rische, städtebauliche, gestalterische, (kultur-)historische, rechtliche, soziale, wirtschaftliche und öko-
logische Zusammenhänge zu erfassen, in einem Abwägungsprozess zu bewerten und vor dem Hinter-
grund neuer Anforderungen Nutzungs- und Gestaltungskonzepte zu entwickeln. 
Traditionell profi liert sich das Bachelor-Studium der Stadt-und Regionalplanung an der TU Berlin durch 
eine besondere Betonung des Projektstudiums. Im zweijährigen konsekutiven Masterstudiengang kön-
nen die Studierenden ihr Wissen in fünf Schwerpunkten vertiefen: Städtebau und Wohnungswesen, 
Bestandsentwicklung und Erneuerung von Siedlungseinheiten, örtliche und regionale Gesamtplanung, 
Raumplanung im internationalen Kontext oder Stadt- und Regionalforschung.
Internationale Kooperationen, unter anderem mit China, Italien, Polen, Rumänien und dem Iran, werden 
für interdisziplinäre Studien- und Forschungsprojekte genutzt.
Forschung
Das Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung zeichnet sich durch eine breite Forschungstätigkeit der 
Fachgebiete aus. Ein bedeutender Anteil der Forschung ist fremdfi nanziert (sog. Drittmittel). Auftrag-
geber der Drittmittelprojekte sind die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), die Europäische Kom-
mission, Ministerien und deren Forschungsabteilungen, Bundesländer, Kommunen, Stiftungen und Ver-
bände sowie in Einzelfällen Unternehmen. Eine weitere wichtige Forschungsleistung des Instituts sind 
Dissertationen und Habilitationen.
Die Ergebnisse der Forschungsprojekte fl ießen sowohl methodisch als auch inhaltlich in die Lehre ein. 
Eine profi lgestaltende Beziehung zwischen Forschungsaktivitäten und Studium ist durch den eigenen 
Studienschwerpunkt „Stadt- und Regionalforschung“ im Master vorgesehen.
Sowohl über Forschungs- als auch über Studienprojekte bestehen enge Kooperationen und institutio-
nelle Verbindungen mit Kommunen und Regionen wie auch mit anderen universitären oder außeruniver-
sitären wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen.
Weitere Informationen über das ISR fi nden Sie auf der Homepage des Instituts unter: http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/ und 
in dem regelmäßig erscheinenden „ereignIS.Reich“, das Sie kostenlos per Mail oder Post beziehen können.
